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NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The landmark Unocal1 case provided the standard under Del-
aware law by which to judge the defensive efforts of a
corporation's management and board of directors when control of
the company is threatened. Though only promulgated in 1985,
the test has received a great deal of attention due to the surge in
takeover activity in the 1980s.
At first, the test appeared to be a significant bulwark against
the erosion of share value in the face of management entrench-
ment. However, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,2
the Delaware Supreme Court effectively narrowed the scope of
judicial review of the board of directors' actions in response to a
threatened takeover.3 After Time, a director's duty of care and
loyalty to the shareholder does not include share value maximiza-
tion (at least not over any definitive period),4 except in very lim-
ited instances.5 Directors may now fulfill their duty through the
application of long-term business plans, regardless of their effect
as anti-takeover devices.6
For better or worse, after Time, directors have greater protec-
tion from being ousted from their posts and shareholders have
reduced ability to realize maximum share value.7
Part II of this Note traces the Unocal standard to its origin in
the duties of care and loyalty and discusses the conflicts between
the accompanying judicial standards of review. It then introduces
the solution proffered by the Delaware Supreme Court. Part III
analyzes the development of the standard through the major cas-
es. As the standard is fact specific, this Note discusses the cases in
some detail. Part IV distills the holdings and dicta from the cases
to determine the essential parameters of the standard through
Time. Part V discusses the propriety of the direction taken by the
1 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
2 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
3 See infra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 23944.
6 Assuming that such plans do not absolutely preclude a tender offer. See infra
notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
7 Shareholders' rights have been reduced by limiting the legal avenues to protest
share value reduction. Time effectively limited legal recourse to egregious circumstances.
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the investment horizon of the company was
exclusively the domain of the board of directors. See infra note 208 and accompanying
text.
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Delaware court with regard to the Unocal standard and concludes
that Unocal is properly applied as a threshold test.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE UNOCAL TEST
The duties of care and loyalty owed to the corporation by
the board of directors can be severely tested by the myriad defen-
sive and hostile maneuvers routinely made in the context of mod-
em mergers and acquisitions. Before beginning the analysis of the
development in Delaware cases of the complex interplay between
these duties, a discussion of the standards themselves is in order.
A. The Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty
The board of directors is ultimately responsible for the man-
agement of the corporation and accordingly owes a duty of due
care in carrying out its function. The standard of care owed to
the corporation by the board of directors is that of a reasonable
director.' However, in a claim of misfeasance by the board, the
court will initially defer to the business judgment of the directors
of the corporation before applying the reasonable director stan-
dard. This initial deference is known as the business judgment
rule. The business judgment rule "is a presumption that in mak-
ing a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company."9 Tradi-
tionally, the Delaware courts have held that unless the plaintiff
can establish a failure of this standard, the court will not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the board.'0
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,n the Delaware Supreme Court re-
8 In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963),
the court enunciated the reasonable director standard when it said, "[d]irectors of a
corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care
which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances." Id. at
130. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court cited DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(1974) for the general delegation of corporate responsibility from which the fiduciary
duties of the board arise. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
9 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981). See also Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-293 (3d Cir. 1980) (summary of the business judgment
rule under Delaware law), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
10 "We will not substitute our views for those of the board if the latter's decision
can be 'attributed to any rational business purpose.'" 493 A.2d at 949 (quoting Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
11 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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fined this standard when it stated, "the concept of gross negli-
gence is the proper standard for determining whether a business
judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed
one."12 In effect, this collapsed the review of directors' actions
down to one standard-gross negligence." Grossly negligent con-
duct of a director makes the next step in the duty of care ana-
lysis, the reasonable director standard, afait accompli. 4
Directors also owe a duty to act solely in the best interests of
the corporation. This director's duty of loyalty is codified in sec-
tion 144 of title 8 of the Delaware Code. The section states that a
transaction is not "void or voidable solely for [a director's conflict
of interest]" if (i) the transaction was approved by a majority of
disinterested directors, or (ii) the transaction was specifically ap-
proved by the shareholders, or (iii) the transaction is fair as to
the corporation. 5 Though the test is disjunctive as written, in
practice, the fairness prong is applied in judicial review regardless
of the disposition of the first two prongs. 6
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, the director's duty
of loyalty necessarily intersects the duty of care. In Bennett v.
Propp,"' the Delaware Supreme Court recognized a special spe-
12 Id. at 873.
13 This is not to say that a showing of bad faith will not preclude the operation of
the business judgment rule. Nonetheless, an honest good faith belief becomes irrelevant
in the presence of a grossly negligent action by the board.
14 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988) allows corporations to include a
provision in their articles of incorporation which essentially eliminates negligence liability
of directors for monetary damages. This section was purportedly written in response to
the Van Gorkom decision and represents the greatest stride thus far in the "race to the
bottom." If the corporation invokes this provision in its articles, the entire arena of the
duty of care is inoperative as actions by directors would have to be at least recklessly or
intentionally committed to be actionable. In most cases, the more likely cause of action
would then be fraud. However, it is important to note that this section does not pre-
clude actions in equity-injunctions and rescission-which are the remedies of choice in
many merger and acquisition contexts. See generaUy Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An
Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMPLE L.Q. 13 (1988); Lanznar, Defensive Tactics: How
to Fend Off the Attackers, 5 CoMPLEAT LAw. 20 (1988); Oesterle, The Effect of Statutes Lim-
iting Directors Due Care Liability on Hostile Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L REv. 31
(1989).
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974).
16 The cases refer to the fairness prong as the "entire fairness" test, Mills Acquisi-
tion Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988), or the "intrinsic fairness
test", Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987). The
terms are interchangeable.
17 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962). Later, in Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), the Delaware Supreme Court had
occasion to spell out the application of these duties. The duty of loyalty requires that,
directors must eschew any conflict between duty and self-interest. They cannot
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cies of conflict of interest in these situations:
We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of
shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate
policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors are
of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an ob-
jective decision is difficult .... Hence, in our opinion, the
burden should be on the directors to justify such a purchase
as one primarily in the corporate interest.18
The court later, in Cheff v. Mathes, 9 revisited this situation and
said that though the directors in this context do have a conflict of
interest, it is qualitatively different from the usual conflict of in-
terest situation and "[a]ccordingly ... will not be held to the
same standard of proof."2" In this context directors have a duty
to not only act without self-interested motives, but must take rea-
sonable care in making these decisions.
Cheff represented the Delaware Supreme Court's initial re-
sponse to this tension between director conflict of interest and
the business judgment rule. The case involved the propriety of a
stock repurchase made to thwart a hostile acquirer. The Cheff
court held that the issue was "whether or not defendants satisfied
the burden of proof of showing reasonable grounds to believe a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed."" The
court found there were numerous threats to which the board
could have reasonably reacted, such as the unrest of the
workforce and the reputation of the acquirer for "bust-up" take-
overs. But, the court placed the greatest emphasis on the threat-
ened change in the target's sales policy which the board viewed as
vital to the company's success. In the face of these "threats," the
court found that defensive action did not constitute the "improp-
er desire to maintain control."22
Professors Gilson and Kraakman 2' have described the court's
succumb to influences which convert an otherwise valid business decision into a
faithless act. On the other hand, the duty of care requires a director, when
making a business decision, to proceed with a "critical eye" by acting in an in-
formed and deliberate manner respecting the corporate merits of an issue be-
fore the board.
Id. at 1345 (citations omitted).
18 187 A.2d at 409.
19 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
20 199 A.2d at 554-5.
21. IL at 555.
22 Id. at 556.
23 Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
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handling of the tangential relationship between the business judg-
ment rule and director conffict of interest in Cheff by noting:
If a target's directors could demonstrate disagreement over
corporate policy with a would-be acquirer, they were presumed
to act from business consideration rather than self-interest.
With the specter of a breach of duty of loyalty thus conve-
niently set aside, the appropriate standard of review became
the business judgment rule .... 24
With the advent of the corporate raider in the 1980s, the
protection provided the shareholder under the Cheff rule was
rendered ineffectual. The court felt restraint in this area was nec-
essary, at least to a certain extent, as "by the very nature of cor-
porate life a director has a certain amount of self-interest in ev-
erything he does." 25 The result was cautious regulation, when it
was applied at all;
Certainly, application of the fairness test was not justified, at
least initially, for this "qualitatively different" conflict of interest.
The solution would require some threshold test to determine if
the judgment of the court should be substituted for that of the
directors, as in the case of the fairness test, or if the business
judgment rule should be applied. The Unocal case provided this
test.
B. Unocal: A Second Step Is Added to Cheff
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.26 the Delaware Su-
preme Court adopted a new, intermediate level of review of tar-
get directors' actions in response to a hostile tender offer.
On April 8, 1985, Mesa,27 which owned 13% of Unocal's
outstanding stock, announced a "front loaded" tender offer.28
The front end was cash for sixty-four million shares (about 37%)
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989).
24 Id. at 249 (emphasis in original).
25 Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 99
(1981).
26 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
27 T. Boone Pickens, Jr. was president and chairman of the board of Mesa Petro-
leum and controlled the amalgam of Mesa entities that were parties to the action.
28 A front loaded, two-tier merger usually involves an offer for just over 50% of the
outstanding shares. The offeror gains control of the company and subsequently offers
junk bonds or notes for the remaining shares (or some portion thereof). The second
step of the merger may be valued at substantially less than the initial control purchase
so that the offeror can squeeze out the minority shareholders. This forces shareholders
to tender into the front end as quickly as possible to avoid the squeeze at the back-end.
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of Unocal's outstanding stock at $54 per share. The back end of
Mesa's plan offered highly subordinated debt securities (in this
case, junk bonds) purportedly worth $54 per share, for the re-
maining shares.29 On April 13, Unocal's board of directors,"0 af-
ter receiving detailed presentations from their attorneys and in-
vestment bankers,"1 unanimously rejected the Mesa offer as inad-
equate. On April 15, the board met again and adopted a resolu-
tion stating that if Mesa acquired a total of 51% of Unocal's
stock, then Unocal would offer to exchange the remaining out-
standing shares (49%) for senior debt securities having an aggre-
gate par value of $72 per share. The board purportedly did this
to adequately compensate the shareholders that otherwise would
be frozen out on the back end of the merger proposal. It thereby
had the effect of limiting the coercive aspect of Mesa's offer.
Mesa was excluded from the exchange offer. On April 17, Unocal
commenced their exchange offer. Mesa, as a stockholder, chal-
lenged the board's power to exclude it from the exchange of-
fer.32
The Delaware Supreme Court first dealt with the board of
directors' power to adopt a defensive measure that excluded a
minority shareholder. The court concluded that a board has the
power to deal selectively with its stockholders."3 The court stat-
ed, "the board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty
and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes
stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its
source." ' Unocal's board protected the other shareholders from
the coercive effects of Mesa's bid to acquire the company. The
court found this action acceptable. 5
29 493 A.2d at 949.
30 Unocal's board consisted of eight outside directors and six inside directors. Id. at
950.
31 At the April 13, 1985 meeting, Unocal's investment advisors, Goldman, Sachs &
Co. and Dillon, Read & Co. were of the opinion that the minimum cash liquidation
value of Unocal's stock was in excess of $60. Id.
32 Id. at 951.
33 The court relied primarily on two sections of the Delaware Code in reaching this
conclusion: the inherent powers conferred on a board respecting management of a
corporation's business and affairs given by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) and a
corporation's extensive authority to deal in its own stock conferred by DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 160(a) (1974). 493 A.2d at 954.
34 493 A.2d at 954.
35 The court noted a board "may deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the
directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in of-
fice." Id. See also Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962).
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The more significant issue (in retrospect) was whether
Unocal's action would receive the protection of the business judg-
ment rule. The Delaware Supreme Court noted, in oft quoted
language, that when a board of directors addresses a takeover bid
there is an inherent conflict of interest:
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be act-
ing primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the
protection of the business judgment rule may be conferred.'
The enhanced duty requires a board of directors that takes defen-
sive action in response to a tender offer to show (i) good faith
and reasonable investigation in concluding there was a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness 7 (the Cheff analysis), and (ii)
that the actions taken to oppose the takeover were "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."3" The second prong requires an
analysis of both the threat and the response to determine if the
board's action was proportionate to the danger.3 9 This is the
"Unocal test."
Under the first prong of the test,4" the court held that
Unocal's board had demonstrated their good faith and reasonable
investigation in determining that the $54 per share offer was
inadequate and a threat to shareholder interests. The two-tier
nature of the offer was coercive and therefore a threat, because
shareholders, fearing that they would receive very little at the
back-end of the transaction, would be forced to tender into the
front-end.41 The first prong satisfied.
36 493 A.2d at 954.
37 The court noted that "such proof is materially enhanced, as here, by the approv-
al of a board comprised of a majority of outside directors who have acted in accordance
with the foregoing standards." I at 955.
38 Id.
39 The court gave examples of factors that a board may weigh in responding to a
bid:
[I]nadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of
illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of
nonconsummation, and the quality of the securities being offered in the ex-
change . . . it also seems to us that a board may reasonably consider the basic
stockholder interests at stake, including those of the short term speculators.
Id. at 955-56. The court made clear that this list was not all-inclusive.
40 Id. at 955.
41 The "junk bonds" at the back-end would, in all likelihood, be worth less than
$54 cash. Id. at 956.
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The second prong of the analysis, that the actions taken to
oppose the takeover were "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed,"42 focused on the exchange offer-the Unocal board's re-
sponse to the two-tier offer. The court found that the offer would
either compensate those shareholders that otherwise would be
inadequately compensated on the back-end, or it would defeat the
coercive tender offer. Both purposes were found reasonable and
fair.
43
The valid pursuit of these purposes would have been nullified
by Mesa's participation in the exchange offer. If Mesa had been
allowed to tender its shares, Unocal would have, in effect, subsi-
dized Mesa's inadequate offer and the resulting displacement of
the minority shareholders that Unocal's offer was designed to
protect.' Since the court found the defensive actions reasonable
in relation to the threat, the business judgment rule protected
Unocal's self-tender.
C. The Standard Defined
Unocal established a threshold review of director action in
response to tender offers. It was an intermediate standard that
bridged the gap between the business judgment rule and the
intrinsic fairness test. Under the Unocal test, a board's decision to
deal selectively in its own stock for the purpose of protecting
shareholder value was reasonable in relation to the threat of an
inadequate, two-tier, coercive tender offer. However, it was not
evident from the opinion whether that response would be reason-
able in the context of a different type of threat. The narrow facts
of Unocal left unmapped expanses under the new standard as to
what constitutes a "threat" and what defensive actions by a board
of directors would be reasonable in relation to different kinds of
threats.
45
42 1& at 955.
43 The court noted that Unocal's partial offer was "consistent with the principle that
the minority stockholder shall receive the substantial equivalent of what he had before."
Id. at 956.
44 The purpose of the exchange offer was to protect a class of shareholders that
otherwise would have been injured by Mesa's tender offer. Mesa, by definition, would
not fall within that class of shareholders.
45 The general terms of the Unocal test, although creating some uncertainty in the
practice of law, allow courts to apply the test somewhat tailored to each case. "The
usefulness of Unocal as an analytical tool is precisely its flexibility in the face of a variety
of fact scenarios." Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153
(Del. 1989).
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The Delaware Supreme Court, in two subsequent cases, ex-
plored some of the logical consequences of the new standard.
These cases represented polar applications and served to delin-
eate, in broad strokes, the expanse of Unocal.
1. Moran: Confirmation of the Intermediate Approach
Moran v. Household International, Inc.46 was the first case after
Unocal to use the new standard. What distinguishes Moran from
the rest of Unocal's progeny is that the board's defensive actions
were not taken in reaction to a specific threat by a hostile
acquirer. Yet, the court found that a sufficient threat existed to
satisfy the new Unocal test.4"
The Household directors became concerned about the
company's vulnerability to a hostile tender offer in February 1984.
By the summer of 1985, the board had formulated and adopted a
poison pill in the form of a "flip-over" rights plan.4" The plan,
most significantly, enabled shareholders, in the event of a merger
or consolidation, to purchase $200 of the acquirer's common
stock for $100."9
Moran was a director of Household and through his compa-
ny, the largest single stockholder. Moran initiated merger talks
during this time, but negotiations did not progress beyond the
discussion stage. Moran protested the adoption of the poison pill
and filed suit.
The Delaware Supreme Court noted that in the context of "a
pre-planned defensive maneuver it seems even more appropriate
to apply the business judgment rule."5" Nevertheless, the court
found that the rights plan was not irrevocable-the board could
not arbitrarily reject a request to redeem the rights plan. Any
such action would be governed by the Unocal standard.
46 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
47 Id. See generally Bloomenthal, Tender Offer Defenses - Poison Pill or Placebo?, 8 SEC.
& FED. CORP. L Rrp. 145 (1986); Note, Delaware Serves Shareholden the "Poison Pill", 27
B.C.L REV. 641 (1986).
48 The "poison pill" is typically in the form of a shareholder right to purchase
shares of common stock at a discounted price. The rights become effective and transfer-
able when an outside purchaser reaches a pre-set ownership level of the issuer's common
stock. The flip-over provision entitles the holder of a right to acquire shares of an
acquiring corporation at a drastically reduced price. The flip-in provision permits the
holder of the right to buy shares of the target corporation at a drastically reduced price,
thus diluting the acquirer's ownership interest.
49 500 A.2d at 1349.
50 500 A.2d at 1350.
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The court then described the newly created Unocal standard
and its relation to the business judgment rule. "[I]n Unocal we
held that when the business judgment rule applies to adoption of
a defensive mechanism, the initial burden will lie with the direc-
tors."51 This initial burden is satisfied by the now familiar show-
ing of a threat to corporate policy (satisfied by good faith and
reasonable investigation) and showing that the defensive mech-
anism was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. "Then, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiffs who have the ultimate burden
of persuasion to show a breach of the director's fiduciary du-
ties."52
The court then proceeded to reverse the order of analysis by
first holding that the directors were not grossly negligent in tak-
ing the defensive action. After which, the court declared that "the
Directors reasonably believed Household was vulnerable to coer-
cive acquisition techniques [the threat] and adopted a reasonable
defensive mechanism to protect itself [the reasonable relationship
test].""3 The court concluded its opinion by reminding the direc-
tors that though the board passed the Unocal test and was thereby
protected at this juncture by the business judgment rule, when
confronted by a hostile offeror the directors' actions must again
be reviewed under the Unocal standard.'
The significance of Moran lies in the Delaware Supreme
Court's confirmation of the Unocal approach to tender offer litiga-
tion. The court was somewhat tentative in its application of the
Unocal standard and appeared to water .down the threat require-
ment as Household was not faced with a cognizable threat from a
51 Id. at 1356.
52 Id
53 Id. at 1357.
54 For cases where the question is one of whether the Unocal standard should
apply, see Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1141 (Del. 1990) (where the target
board reached a settlement with an offeror, the settlement was viewed as a defensive
response and was subject to review under Unocal); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, Civ. A. No.
10,095 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 1988) (1988 WL 85491) (The board of Wilson Foods Corp.
tabled a planned defensive strategy for reconsideration in the face of a tender offer. The
court held that once the board makes a decision on the tabled plan such action will be
reviewable under UnocaL However, the court will not anticipate such decisions and
render what amounts to an advisory opinion as to the validity of the proposed action.);
Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., Civ. A. No. 9569 (Del. Ch. April 12,
1988) (1988 WL 23945) (Defendant, Santa Fe, claimed that the issuance of dividends
were protected under the business judgment rule and therefore Unocal was inapposite.
However, the court found that the dividend, issued after the announcement of a proxy
contest, that included a debenture subject to certain restrictions "that could deter an
acquirer, was defensive in nature and therefore subject to Unocal upon review.).
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hostile acquirer. In addition, the court let stand, what was at min-
imum a potentially preclusive action, the poison pill. Nevertheless,
the court's warning that the pill would have to withstand judicial
scrutiny if and when the company was actually faced with a ten-
der offer by a hostile acquirer, signaled that the poison pill's effi-
cacy remained in limbo.
2. Revlon: A Sub-set of the Unocal Test
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,55 the
Delaware Supreme Court applied the Unocal standard of review to
a bidding contest between a hostile acquirer and a white
knight.56 The court objected to the Revlon board's halting of the
auction process prematurely after entering into a "lock-up agree-
ment"5 7 (among other things5") with the white knight,
Forstmann, Little & Co. (Forstmann). In the process, the court
formulated a new subset of the Unocal standard of review.
Following the breakdown of discussions between Pantry
Pride59 and Revlon, the Revlon board employed several defensive
measures designed to thwart an anticipated takeover attempt by
Pantry Pride.60 Thereafter, Pantry Pride made a hostile offer for
Revlon's shares at $47.50. Revlon, in turn, announced an ex-
change of notes for stock valued at $47.50. These notes contained
covenants which limited Revlon's ability to take on additional
55 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
56 "White knight" is Wall Street parlance for a favored acquirer, who rides in to
save the company from an "evil" hostile bidder. The nature of mergers and acquisitions
has inspired this feudal theme which Martin Lipton and Erica Steinberger have dramat-
ically taken up in the prologue to their treatise. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, 1 TAKE-
OVERS & FREEZEOUTS (1988).
57 A "lock-up" is an agreement to sell assets (usually a division of the company) to
the favored acquirer on the occurrence of another party obtaining a certain number of
shares in the company. In Revlon, the lock-up price was "some $100-$175 million below
the value ascribed to them by Lazard Freres, [conditional on] another acquirer *[obtain-
ing] 40% of Revlon's shares." 506 A.2d at 178.
58 The chancellor also enjoined a "no-shop" and cancellation agreement. See infra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
59 "The nominal plaintiff, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., is the controlling
stockholder of Pantry Pride." 506 A.2d at 175.
60 Special counsel, Martin Lipton, of Wachtell, Upton, Rosen & Katz, recommended
Revlon repurchase up to five million of its almost 30 million outstanding shares of stock
and adopt a "poison pill" based on a "Note Purchase Rights Plan." Id. at 177. The plan
was triggered upon anyone acquiring beneficial ownership of 20% of the company's
stock and enabled shareholders to exchange shares for one year notes at a principal
value of $65. In essence, this would bar hostile offers below $65. Pantry Pride filed for
a restraining order on the plan and its subsequent bids were conditioned on the re-
demption, rescission, or voiding of the plan.
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debt.8J' The shareholders reacted positively to this offer, and
Revlon obtained 10 million of its own shares.62 In response, Pan-
try Pride raised their bid to $50, and then again to $53.65
In the meantime, the Revlon board had been' discussing a
leveraged buy-out (LBO)" merger with Forstmann. The condi-
tions of the merger included Revlon's agreement to waive the
covenants of the notes, for which Forstmann, in return, would
offer the shareholders $56 per share and assume the $475 million
debt on the notes. In order to finance the LBO by Forstmann,
Revlon would sell one division prior to the merger and
Forstmann would sell several Revlon divisions afterward.65
After the merger was announced, note prices declined dra-
matically. The holders became disgruntled and threatened to sue
on the basis of Revlon's agreement with Forstmann to waive the
covenants. Pantry Pride raised its bid to $56.25 and declared its
intention to top any bid. Forstmann then offered $57.25 and
agreed to support the price of the sagging notes (a major concern
of the Revlon directors) on condition that Revlon give a lock-up
option on two of Revlon's divisions at a price well below valua-
tion. In addition, Revlon was to sign a "no-shop" and cancellation
agreement.66
The Revlon board approved Forstmann's offer. They justified
their acceptance on three grounds. First, the price exceeded Pan-
try Pride's offer (though they were well aware of Pantry Pride's
declaration to top any bid). Second, Forstmann would protect the
interests of the noteholders by supporting the price of the notes.
Third, .Forstmann had its financing in place. Pantry Pride re-
sponded by seeking an injunction in the Court of Chancery and
raising its bid to $58, conditioned upon the nullification of the
rights plan, waiver of the note covenants, and an injunction
61 The covenants also limited the ability to sell assets or pay dividends unless ap-
proved by the independent directors as well. Id.
62 Though 87% of Revlon's almost 30 million outstanding shares were tendered, the
offer was for only 10 million shares. Id.
63 Id.
64 The leverage in an LBO is provided by the target company itself; financing is
secured by the assets of. the target..
65 506 A.2d at 178.
66 A no-shop agreement requires that the target not solicit additional offers. The
cancellation agreement provided for a payment of $25 million to Forstmann in the event
of termination of the agreement or another acquirer obtaining more than 19.9% of the
stock. 506 A.2d at 178.
67 Actually, the state of both Forstmann and Pantry Prides financing was virtually
identical. Id. at 179.
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against the lock-up agreement. The Court of Chancery enjoined
the lock-up and no-shop agreements, as well as the cancellation
fee." The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed. 9
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis by stating
that Unocal provided the applicable standard for review of the
board's actions. The court applied this analysis to the poison pill
(rights plan) as well as to the exchange offer and found that the
board acted with due care and that the response was reasonable
in relation to the threat Pantry Pride posed.
However, when Pantry Pride increased its offer to $50 per
share, and then to $53, it became apparent to all that the
break-up of the company was inevitable. The Revlon board's
authorization permitting management to negotiate a merger or
buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company
was for sale.70
These actions by Revlon's board triggered what has become
known as "Revlon mode."7  When a corporation is in Revlon
mode, the Court no longer considers a hostile offer a threat. As
in the event of a sale of corporate control, there is no continuing
corporate policy or entity to threaten. Therefore, defensive tactics
are impermissible as they can bear no relation to a non-existent
threat.72 In Revlon, "[tihe whole question of defensive measures
became moot. The directors' role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company." 73
Through this analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court found the
merger agreement did not fulfill this duty to maximize sharehold-
er value. The provisions, and in particular the lock-up, had the
68 MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.
1985), aft'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
69 506 A.2d at 176.
70 Id. at 182.
71 "On the level of legal doctrine, it is clear that under Delaware law, directors are
under no obligation to act so as to maximize the immediate value of the corporation or
its shares, except in the special case in which the corporation is in a 'Revlon mode.'"
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,514 at 93,277 (Del. Ch.), affid, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Theodore N.
Mirvis of Wachtell, Upton, Rosen & Katz, a premier M & A- defense firm, described the
result as "scar[y] Revlon-land, in which directors set foot only at the peril of being
consumed by goblins lurking around every doctrinal corner." Mirvis, Effiient Market
Theoty Doomed in Delaware, Nat'l UJ., Nov. 6, 1989, at S4, col. 1.
72 "Thus, nothing remained for Revlon to legitimately protect, and no rationally
related benefit thereby accrued to the stockholders." 506 A.2d at 183.
73 Id.
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effect of prematurely ending the auction prior to obtaining the
highest price for the company, to the detriment of the share-
holders. The court did not rule out the use of lock-ups, cancella-
tion fees, and no-shop provisions per se, but stated that the effect
of these in response to a hostile takeover must be to benefit.
shareholders. 4 In essence, they must spur further bidding rather
than preclude it.
The court applied the Unocal test to determine whether a
legitimate threat existed. Upon the determination that there was
no threat to corporate existence (sale of the corporation was "in-
evitable") the only threat that remained was to the shareholders'
interests. Whereupon the only legitimate interest the directors had
to protect was shareholder value. The court found that the direc-
tors did not fulfill this duty and the transaction was unfair to
shareholder interests. 5
Revlon mode is essentially a subset of the Unocal test. Mem-
bership in this subset is triggered by the sale of the corporation
or its component parts.76 At this point, the Unocal test devolves
into purely a test of maximization of shareholder value. The fail-
ure of this test, as in the failure of the standard generally, shifts
the standard of review to its most strict level, the intrinsic fairness
test.
77
74 Id.
75 "Where director action is not protected by the business judgment rule ... the
transaction can only be sustained if it is objectively or intrinsically fair; an honest belief
that the transaction was entirely fair will not alone be sufficient." AC Acquisitions Corp.
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115 (Del. 1986).
76 See Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to Act as an Auc-
tioneer, 44 Bus. LAw. 275 (1989). Reder contends that the language of Revlon specifically
refers to "bust-up" situations (where a company's divisions are sold off to finance the
LBO) and that therefore, Revlon mode is only entered in the face of such a threat. Until
Time, this article appeared misguided, as the Delaware courts appeared to apply the
standard on a much broader basis. Specifically, change in control of the corporation was
considered the Revlon trigger. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. However, the
court in Time narrowed the scope of Revlon with specific reference to "bust-up" sce-
narios, yet the court implied a broader range of possible Revlon applications. See infra
text accompanying note 239.
77 Gilson and Kraakman have noted that Revlon could be read to minimalize the
proportionality test. In essence, it does this by providing the automatic assumption of
shareholder value maximization due to the lack of a threat to the corporation. "Unocal,
Moran, and Revlon can be read to suggest that proportionality review is primarily a
formal, rhetorical instruction rather than a substantive standard of review ....
Revlon ... may be consistent with this minimalist construction insofar as it pointedly
invokes the directors' duty of loyalty in lieu of a proportionality argument when it
enjoins management's defensive lock-up option." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at
252. However accurate the argument for lack of substance in the proportionality test
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNOCAL STANDARD
After this trilogy of cases it was clear that the Unocal stan-
dard was a force to be reckoned with in the Delaware corporate
world. The range of Unocal's application, at least at the extremes,
had been defined and the mode of application by the courts clari-
fied. Nonetheless, there remained (and to an extent will remain
indefinitely) two principal areas of uncertainty. First, what were
the cognizable threats under the standard, and the range of re-
sponses reasonable in relation to those threats. Second, when
were Revlon duties triggered. The cases do not discretely address
either one or the other of these issues, but rather the issues are
necessarily interwoven. 8 However, for the purposes of this Note
the cases may be organized along these lines.
A. Unocal's Threats and Reasonable Responses
1. Interco: A Portend of Proportionality
In City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc.,79
Chancellor Allen reviewed the response of directors to a non-co-
ercive tender offer. On July 11, 1988, Interco's board," con-
cerned about the increased trading activity of its stock, adopted a
poison pill consisting of a shareholder rights plan with both flip-in
and flip-over provisions.8' On July 15, the chairman of Interco's
board issued a press release announcing that he intended to rec-
ommend a major restructuring of the company. On July 27, the
Rales brothers offered to acquire Interco through their acquisition
vehicle City Capital Associates (CCA), for $64 per share, all cash.
Later they increased the offer to $70 per share.
Subsequently, Interco's investment bank, Wasserstein Perella,
informed the board that in their opinion $70 per share was inad-
equate. 2 The board rejected the CCA proposal and elected to
may be, Revlon does not appear to be a bellwether case. Rather, Revlon functions as a
bright line within the Unocal rule that actually defines the substance of the rule under
the particular circumstances; the only actions deemed reasonably proportional during the
sale of corporate control are those that serve to maximize shareholder value. See infra
text accompanying notes 239-44.
78 As a subset of Unocal, Revlon necessarily implicates the Unocal standard. Likewise,
in applying Unocal, the knowledge that Revlon is not triggered is useful.
79 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
80 Interco's board consisted of seven inside directors and seven outside directors. Id.
at 791.
81 See supra note 48.
82 On August 8, Wasserstein Perella valued Interco at $68 to $80 per share. 551
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explore a restructuring alternative. One week later, CCA an-
nounced a public tender offer for all shares at $72 per share. On
September 19, Interco's board met, rejected the $72 offer as inad-
equate and adopted a restructuring plan."3
The restructuring called for Interco to sell its most valuable
asset (Ethan Allen Furniture), which generated approximately one-
half of Interco's gross income, and to borrow $2.025 billion.
Shareholders were to receive two cash dividends totalling $38.15
per share, various subordinated debentures, convertible preferred
stock and a stub equity interest. Wasserstein Perella opined that
this combined restructuring would be worth $76 per share. 4
On October 18, 1988 CCA raised its bid to $74 per share, all
cash. Interco's board rejected the offer as inadequate and imple-
mented the defensive strategies. CCA sued to redeem the poison
pill and restrain the restructuring, most notably the sale of Ethan
Allen. The chancellor granted the first request but refused to
enjoin the sale of Ethan Allen. 5
Under the first prong of the Unocal test, the chancellor rea-
soned that as this was a non-coercive cash offer for all shares, the
threat was to shareholder economic interest in the form of ade-
quacy of price." A shareholder could prefer "a $74 cash pay-
ment now to the complex future consideration offered through
the restructuring."17 The chancellor also noted that the pill gave
the board leverage against an offeror and could give the board
"such time as it required in good faith to arrange an alternative
value-maximizing transaction, then.., the legitimate role of the
poison pill in the context of a noncoercive offer will have been
fully satisfied." 8
Though the chancellor seemed to find the threat somewhat-
tenuous, he nevertheless decided the pill was not proportional to
A.2d at 792.
83 I at 793-94.
84 Regarding the valuation, the chancellor noted that Wasserstein Perella was to
receive a substantial contingency fee if the restructuring was successfully completed.
Therefore they had "a rather straightforward and conventional conflict of interest when
[they] opine[d] that the inherently disputable value of its restructuring is greater than
the all cash alternative offered by the, plaintiffs." Id. at 793. See also infra note 144.
85 Id. at 801.
86 The chancellor delineated two types of threats created by a tender offer. "Broad-
ly speaking, threats to shareholders in that context may be of two types: threats to the
voluntariness of the choice offered by the offer, and threats to the substantive economic
interest represented by the stockholding." Id. at 797.
87 Id. at 799.
88 Id. at 798.
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the threat of CCA's offer and ordered its redemption. 9 CCA's
victory on the issue of the poison pill was a pyrrhic one due to
the chancellor's refusal to enjoin the sale of Ethan Allen. The sale
of Ethan Allen was termed a public sale, "not a 'crown jewel' sale
to a favored bidder."" Although a sale of assets by a target may
complicate an offeror's transaction, an offeror "has no right to
demand that its chosen target remain in status quo.""' As indi-
cated in Unocal, when faced with a hostile tender offer "a board
of directors is not a passive instrumentality."92 This holding by
the chancellor recognizes a board of directors' considerable ability
to implement alternative corporate transactions in good faith that
make the target less attractive for a possible LBO."
The chancellor, by weighing the level of the threat and then
the proportionality of the response thereto, gave substance to the
"in relation" portion of the Unocal test. Moreover, by finding that
the threat was to shareholder interests94 the chancellor opened
the door for the court to determine which of the competing of-
fers was better for the shareholders. 95
2. AC Acquisitions: Is Substantive Proportionality for Real?
Chancellor Allen reviewed another type of corporate restruc-
turing in the context of a hostile takeover attempt in AC Acquisi-
tions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.9" As a result of a confluence of
factors, 7 the board of directors of Anderson, Clayton chose to
89 1& at 798-99.
90 551 A.2d at 801.
91 Id. The realistic effect of Interco's defensive restructuring was the withdrawal of
the tender offer by CCA.
92 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
93 The court wrote that if a board "has arrived at a good faith informed determina-
tion that a recapitalization or other form of transaction is more beneficial to sharehold-
ers," Revlon does not command the board to hold an auction of the corporation merely
because part of the restructuring included a sale of a corporate asset. 551 A.2d at 803.
94 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
95 As the court indicated in Time, this interpretation was too "narrow and rigid a
construction of Unocal." Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1153 (Del. 1989). A corporation may be sufficiently threatened, as in Time, by a variety
of factors including potential shareholder ignorance or mistaken belief as to the value of
an offer. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. In addition, the proportionality
of the board's response is for all practical purposes irrelevant, as the court may not
evaluate which offer is better for shareholders. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying
text.
96 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
97 Thirty percent of Anderson, Clayton stock was held in trust for the daughters of
the founder of the company. The trusts were due to terminate in early 1986, and the
beneficiaries were planning to liquidate their holdings. As a result, several options were
[Vol. 66:159
NOTE - THE BOARD IS PARAMOUNT
make a self-tender offer for 65% of its outstanding shares at a
price of $60 per share." Prior to the effectuation of this plan a
group of shareholders, AC Acquisitions, 9 responded by making
a hostile offer of $56 for all shares"° and filed suit to enjoin
the company's self-tender due to its "coercive" nature.
The coercion claim arose from the nature and timing of
management's offer. The company transaction required accep-
tance before completion of the offer. Thus, those stockholders
tendering to AC Acquisitions would be left out of the recapitaliza-
tion transaction if the hostile offer failed."' 1 As Anderson,
Clayton's expected trading range after completion of the company
transaction was estimated from $22 to $52, such a shareholder
could lose substantial value.
The chancellor found the first prong of the Unocal test satis-
fied because:
There is no evidence that the [AC Acquisitions] offer-which is
non-coercive and at a concededly fair price-threatens injury to
shareholders or to the enterprise. However, I take this aspect
of the test to be simply a particularization of the more 'general
requirement that a corporate purpose ... must be served by
the stock repurchase.102
In the second part of the Unocal test, that the defensive re-
sponse be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed,"'03 the
considered to ensure the stability of the company during this significant shift in share
ownership. The board considered a management led buyout, and also employed First
Boston & Co. to search for a possible buyer for the entire company. Neither alternative
proved fruitful and the board instead decided on the partial self-tender. Id. at 105-06.
98 In addition, the company was to then sell 25% of the outstanding shares to an
ESOP (Employment Stock Ownership Plan). This dovetailed with the self-tender by
securing, so Anderson, Clayton claimed, favorable tax treatment for the distribution of
proceeds from the recapitalization. Id. at 108.
99 Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Gruss Petroleum Corp. and Gruss Partners were share-
holders of Anderson, Clayton who formed AC Acquisitions for the purpose of the
tender offer. Id. at 104.
100 Actually, it was announced as a two-step offer with the first step for a minimum
of 51% of the shares at $56 each, and the second step a freeze-out merger at the same
price. Id.
101 519 A.2d at 112-13. The hostile offer was made even less attractive by the condi-
tions AC Acquisitions demanded which were by no means easy to accommodate within
the time constraints and accentuated the tenuousness of the offer. These conditions
included the abandonment of the self-tender and ESOP plan, as well as the amendment
of "Article Eleventh" of the corporation's charter which limited a prospective acquirer's
ability to control the company. Id. at 109.
102 Id. at 112.
103 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). This leg of
the test has remained unchanged and has been quoted verbatim in the opinions apply-
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chancellor found the threat to be slight and the response practi-
cally preclusive. The board's actions were, therefore, unreason-
able." 4 The chancellor held that the company transaction was
"deliberately structured so that no rational shareholder can risk
tendering in to the [AG Acquisitions] offer."" 5 Rather than the
company's self-tender transaction being merely an alternative to
the hostile offer (as it was couched by the Anderson, Clayton
board), it was an all too effective defense to the attempted take-
over. Hence, the intrinsic fairness standard was applied to the
board's actions. The chancellor had clearly characterized the ac-
tions as unfair throughout the opinion and application of the test
was academic.
AC Acquisitions represents the chancellor's continued applica-
tion of a proportionality evaluation between threat and response.
The chancellor finding that the management transaction was prac-
tically preclusive and coercive to the corporation's own sharehold-
ers represented the high point of the Unocal test's substantive
application. Nonetheless, at least two things may be garnered
from AC Acquisitions: the board may offer an alternative
transaction, but the transaction must not act to preclude share-
holders from choosing the hostile offer to qualify for the protec-
tion of the business judgment rule.10 6
ing the test. Though the first prong of the test may have required some development by
the courts to galvanize it for subsequent use, the second prong has been found semanti-
cally unambiguous. The difficulty with this prong lies in the vagaries of its application.
Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 23, explore whether this "proportionality test" will
be able to evolve a comprehensive body of law that illuminates the parameters of action
for a particular level of threat to corporate control. Without a clear indication of what is
"reasonable" in a particular situation directors are acting very much in the dark. See
infra note 245-46 and accompanying text.
104 519 A.2d at 113. "The offer poses a 'threat' . . . in only a special sense ....
[I]t is reasonable to create an option that would permit shareholders to keep an equity
interest in the firm, but, in my opinion, it is not reasonable in relation to such a
'threat' to structure such an option so as to preclude as a practical matter shareholders
from accepting the . . . offer." Id
105 I&
106 Gilson and Kraakman described..the opinion as seeming "to foreclose preclusive
tactics that force shareholders to accept the independence option (or prevent sharehold-
ers from choosing at all)." See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 257. After Time,
the language in parentheses may not be entirely correct, as the standard does not
prevent a board from making the target unattractive or virtually unobtainable; thus
causing the bidder to withdraw the offer. Although this may in fact prevent shareholder
choice, it remains theoretically non-preclusive. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
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3. Polaroid: The Hazards of Instant Case Law
Polaroid P07 and Polaroid 11 0' both arise from the same
hostile tender offer to purchase the Polaroid Corporation. 0 9 On
June 16, 1988, Shamrock acquired slightly less than 5% of
Polaroid's outstanding common stock and sent a letter requesting
a meeting with Polaroid's chief executive officer (CEO). Over the
course of the next several days, Polaroid's management, legal and
investment advisors held strategy sessions to decide on a course
of action. A special board meeting was scheduled for the earliest
date possible."0
At the board meeting, management discussed Shamrock's
overtures and management's comprehensive plan to increase
Polaroid's profitability. An ESOP was an integral part of the plan
and was the subject of Polaroid "l A unanimous board adopted
resolutions authorizing the ESOP."'
107 Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Polar-
oid 1).
108 Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Polar-
oid fl).
109 However, Polaroid's most valuable asset is the "Kodak Litigation." The litigation
commenced in 1976 when Polaroid filed a patent infringement action against Kodak
upon the introduction of Kodak's instant cameras and film. Polaroid succeeded, and ob-
tained a judgment in its favor in 1985. The damages portion of the trial was set to
begin in 1989 (several months after these cases were decided). Polaroid was seeking $5.7
billion in damages. The after tax proceeds of a $5.6 billion recovery paid in 1991 would
be worth over $44 per share. Polaroid II, 559 A.2d at 284.
110 Polaroid I, 559 A.2d at 267.
111 Id. at 268. The facts of Polaroid I developed as follows. For several years
Polaroid's management had seriously been considering the adoption of an ESOP. On
March 29, 1988 the idea of the ESOP, its funding (the funds under consideration to pay
for the ESOP were to come from reductions in several of the employee benefit plans
and the elimination of a one-time seniority 5% pay increase), its effect on shareholder
interests, and the expected positive results of giving the employees a stake in the compa-
ny, were all presented to Polaroid's board of directors. The board approved in principle
a 5% ESOP and authorized management to develop a more detailed plan. On June 14,
at its regularly scheduled meeting, the board approved and adopted an ESOP plan docu-
ment. The size of the ESOP was not discussed. Id. at 264.
Several days later Shamrock informed Polaroid that it had acquired about 5% of
Polaroid's stock and requested a meeting. Faced by a potential acquirer, management de-
cided to increase the ESOP to 18.5% (an ESOP greater than 18.5% would have required.
shareholder approval). The dramatic increase in the size of the ESOP was to be funded,
in large part, by a 5% cut in employee wages. Id. at 266.
On July 12, a special board meeting was held. The board was given no written
materials prior to the meeting. Management discussed Shamrock's overtures and
management's comprehensive plan to increase Polaroid's profitability (the ESOP was an
integral part of the comprehensive plan). The board discussed the ESOP for about, two
hours. Although the board had never considered an ESOP as large as 18.5% or $300
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On September 9, Shamrock commenced an all cash tender
offer for all outstanding shares of Polaroid stock at $42 per share.
The offer was conditioned on judicial invalidation of the ESOP.
On September 19, Polaroid's board, based on a financial analysis
of the offer and Polaroid's future prospects, 12 rejected the
Shamrock offer as inadequate.
Polaroid, over a series of meetings and negotiations, conclud-
ed that a repurchase of stock using a mix of debt and equity was
the appropriate defensive response. Polaroid's directors unani-
mously approved the repurchase plan including an issuance of
preferred stock to Corporate Partners." 3 On February 20, 1989
Polaroid's board approved a partial self-tender for sixteen million
shares at $50 per share."1 4 Shamrock challenged the repurchase
plan and the issuance of the preferred stock to Corporate Part-
ners. Shamrock sought a preliminary injunction to halt the trans-
actions.
Unlike Polaroid I, Unocal was now clearly the appropriate test
to determine whether Polaroid's board would enjoy the protection
of the business judgment rule. The record showed that the board
of directors satisfied the first prong of Unocal, by evidencing good
faith and reasonable investigation"' in concluding the offer
million, its size was not questioned (the board had also never discussed an ESOP that
was to be funded by wage cuts). A unanimous board adopted resolutions authorizing the
ESOP. Shamrock brought suit against Polaroid's directors claiming that they had
breached their fiduciary duties by adopting the ESOP. Id. at 267-68.
Vice-Chancellor Berger found the adoption of the ESOP to be entirely fair. The
vice-chancellor declined to either apply the business judgment rule or Unocal to the
facts. "[N]either a board's failure to become adequately informed nor its failure to apply
a Unocal analysis . . . will automatically invalidate a corporate transaction. Under either
circumstance, the business judgment rule will not be applied and the transaction at issue
will be scrutinized to determine whether it is entirely fair." Id. at 271.
The vice-chancellor noted that the ESOP was funded by the employees rather than
the corporation. The ESOP, although tending to have an anti-takeover aspect, meant
simply that a potential acquirer would probably have to gain the confidence of the
ESOP stockholders to be successful in a takeover attempt. Thus, the ESOP was entirely
fair. Id. at 275.
112 See supra note 109.
113 The equity was to be provided by a special issuance of $300 million of preferred
stock with full voting rights, and two places on the board of directors to Corporate
Partners, a limited partnership in the business of assisting management block tender
offers (a white knight for hire-the so-called "white squire"). Polaroid If, 559 A.2d at
280.
114 Shareholders, to protect their interest, would be forced to sell into the self-tender
at $50 because the remaining stub equity share was expected to trade at about $41 per
share. Id. at 287-88.
115 The board consisted of a large majority of outside directors and had met on at
least six occasions over a four month period. Id. at 287.
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posed a threat.
Although Interco had held that an all-cash offer cannot ordi-
narily be a continuing threat to corporate interests, Vice-Chancel-
lor Berger found that holding inapplicable in the instant case.
Foreshadowing Time, the court cited shareholder confusion as a
threat to Polaroid. The vice-chancellor found that the status of
the Kodak litigation" 6 provoked shareholder uncertainty in as-
sessing the company's value, and shareholders might undervalue
the Kodak judgment. The vice-chancellor concluded that Polaroid
could treat the Shamrock inadequate offer as a threat. 7
The vice-chancellor ruled that the preferred stock issuance
and the self-tender were not unreasonable responses to the inade-
quate tender offer because the self-tender was not preclusive (the
public still had control of Polaroid's stock and could tender their
stub equity into the Shamrock offer). Also, the self-tender, in the
face of an inadequate tender offer, provided value to sharehold-
ers. The preferred stock issuance to Corporate Partners was
found reasonable as well, as it was not preclusive-it merely made
an acquisition more expensive. In relation to the threat, the $300
million equity issuance was deemed not a disproportionate re-
sponse. Thus in the absence of "improper motivation " "' the is-
suance was reasonable.
In particular, Polaroid I and II stand for several propositions.
First, a fiscally solid ESOP that is shareholder neutral and does
not act as a bar to a takeover" 9 is entirely fair.' Secondly, a
board may treat an inadequate offer as a continuing threat. Fi-
nally, a board's decision to take on an equity partner and institute
a partial self-tender that makes a hostile acquisition less likely to
116 See supra note 109. Polaroid's officers and directors could not, without seriously
weakening their bargaining position with Kodak, give a straight-forward representation as
to the amount of the recovery and when it might be obtained. Polaroid II, 559 A.2d at
290.
117 Id.
118 Although the vice-chancellor found no improper motivation she characterized the
Corporate Partners/Polaroid transaction as "a bit too convenient." Id at 291.
119 The vice-chancellor noted that the ESOP had confidential voting and tendering
provisions for the employees. Id.
120 The approval of the ESOP was also cited favorably by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Time as an example of carrying forward a pre-existing transaction in an altered
form. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1989).
The altered transaction in Time resulted in Time incurring over $10 billion in debt and
was a "reasonable and proportionate" response to Paramount's all cash offer/threat. This
result, as well as the result in Polaroid I, should lend confidence that any fiscally sound
ESOP, whenever adopted, will be upheld by a Delaware court.
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succeed is not unreasonable under Unocal. These mechanisms
allowed for shareholder choice were the hostile tender offer to
proceed. The Polaroid II opinion signals the shift from the
chancellor's proportionality review to the less restrictive Time in-
terpretation. The case also revealed an array of weapons that
target corporations and defensive planners could use effectively in
the Delaware courts.
B. The Revlon Trigger
It remained to be seen just how far a corporation could go
before triggering the Revlon duties. It was also somewhat unclear
exactly what those duties were-what protecting immediate share-
holder value entailed. The following cases serve to illuminate at
least some of the shadowy corners of Revlon-land.
1. Newmont Mining- Escape from Revlon-Land
In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,' the Supreme
Court of Delaware revealed some of a board's broad options un-
der Unocal and further delineated the parameters of Revlon
mode. 122
In 1983, Newmont and its largest shareholder, Gold Fields,
signed a standstill agreement. The agreement limited Gold Fields'
interest in Newmont's common stock and their representation on
the board of directors to one third. In addition, Gold Fields
could terminate the agreement if a third party acquired 9.9% or
more of Newmont's outstanding stock.
In August 1987, Ivanhoe 123 deliberately increased its hold-
ing in Newmont to 9.95%, thus giving Gold Fields the option of
terminating its standstill agreement with Newmont. On September
8, 1987 Ivanhoe commenced a hostile tender offer for 42% of
Newmont at $95 per share, later increased to $105 per share.124
Newmont's board met on September 18, 1988, and after a presen-
tation by their investment adviser, Goldman, Sachs and Company,
found the revised offer inadequate. 125 Newmont's management
121 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
122 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
123 Ivanhoe Partners and Ivanhoe Acquisition Corporation (Ivanhoe) were both ac-
quisition vehicles controlled by T. Boone Pickens, Jr.
124 If successful, this would have given Ivanhoe a majority (51%) of Newmont's
voting stock. Ivanhoe gave no firm commitment regarding the second step of the trans-
action involving the remaining shares. 535 A.2d at 1339.
125 The presentation to the board by Goldman, Sachs and Company was based, in
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proposed a restructuring of Newmont that purported to deal with
the "threats" posed by Ivanhoe and Gold Fields. The "proposal
consisted of a large dividend [$33 per share] to be financed by
the sale of Newmont's non-gold assets, and the signing of a new
standstill agreement with Gold Fields to insure Newmont's inde-
pendence." 26
By the terms of the new standstill agreement, Gold Fields
could purchase up to 49.9% of Newmont's common stock and
Gold Fields' representation on the board of directors was limited
to 40%. The agreement was contingent on the $33 per share
dividend, which would finance a street sweep of Newmont stock
by Gold Fields. On September 21 and 22, Gold Fields "swept the
street," purchasing Newmont shares at an average price of $98
until it owned 49.7% of Newmont's common stock. Ivanhoe sued
to rescind the dividend and street sweep. 27
The Delaware Supreme Court found that the stringent Revlon
duties were not triggered. This was because the sale or breakup
of Newmont was not inevitable, as was evidenced by the standstill
agreement and other defensive measures. Although, as a result of
the board's actions Gold Fields owned just less than 50% of the
company, Gold Fields was characterized as merely protecting its
already substantial interest in the company. Additionally, Gold
Fields bought shares in the street sweep only from private sellers
and was limited to 40% of the board of directors. Therefore, the
court found found -there was no change of control of the compa-
ny.12
8
The Unocal test was then applied. The first prong was satis-
fied by the obvious threats posed by Ivanhoe and Gold Fields.129
The threat posed by Ivanhoe's two-tier partial tender offer had
already been characterized in Unocal as coercive and a threat to
shareholder interests.' Newmont's board found the offer to be
part, on revised figures of Newmont's business program which included an increase in
gold production estimates of 50%. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1337. A "street sweep" is a "rapid acquisition of securities on the open
market during and shortly after the pendency of a tender offer for the same class of
securities." Id.
128 Id. at 1345.
129 In applying the Unocal test to Newmont's defensive measures the court noted,
"because Newmont's actions here are so inextricably related, the principles of Unocal
require that they be scrutinized collectively as a unitary response to the perceived
threats." Id. at 1343.
130 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
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inadequate. 31 The court held that Newmont's board was justi-
fied in its belief that Gold Fields constituted a significant threat as
well. As the largest shareholder, no longer subject to the con-
straints of the standstill agreement,. Gold Fields could make its
own play for the company in a manner similar to Ivanhoe.3 2
Applying the second prong of Unocal, the court found
Newmont's actions to be reasonable in response to the coinciding
threats. The Ivanhoe threat was an inadequate, two-tier, coercive
bid. 3 The $33 dividend gave value to shareholders in the face
of Ivanhoe's inadequate bid. The court found that this action,
which diffused the coercive aspects of the Ivanhoe offer was rea-
sonable under Unocal."4 Further, although Gold Fields had nei-
ther made a tender offer nor acted to deprive Newmont of its
independence, the court found that in the context of the Gold
Fields threat, the new standstill agreement and the street sweep
enabling dividend were reasonable in relation to the "threat"
posed by Gold Fields. 3 5
Newmont illustrated the extent to which a board may take
actions to maintain the corporation's independence without trig-
gering Revlon.131 "The Newmont board acted to maintain the
131 The board consisted of a majority of outside directors, "[t]hus, with the indepen-
dent directors in the majority, proof that the board acted in good faith and upon rea-
sonable investigation is materially enhanced." 535 A.2d at 1343.
132 Id at 1342.
133 The Unocal court allowed a board to give value to shareholders in the face of an
inadequate, coercive bid. 493 A.2d at 959.
134 The street sweep deterred the coercive Ivanhoe bid and was viewed "as part of
Newmont's own comprehensive defensive strategy." 535 A.2d at 1343. Thus, the Court
applied an organic analysis to Newmont's defensive actions.
135 Gold Fields was characterized by the court as a potential "unbridled majority
shareholder." Id.
136 The federal district court in Delaware had the opportunity to explore the defi-
nition of control for purposes of triggering Revlon duties in Black & Decker Corp. v.
American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988). Black & Decker made a
tender offer for American Standard shares, to which American Standard responded with
a recapitalization aimed at thwarting the tender offer. At the time of the suit, 92.6% of
American Standard's shares were controlled by the public. The recapitalization plan
would result in management ownership of the outstanding stock in American Standard
increasing from 4.8% to 23.9%, as well as the creation of an ESOP which would control
30.6% of the stock. Id. at 782.
American Standard argued that the ESOP's shares should not be considered in
conjunction with management holdings (Black & Decker's contention) and, therefore, a
control block was not affected. However, the fact that the court found most persuasive
was that a majority of shares in the corporation would no longer be held in the public
market. The court found "[t]he entire Recapitalization plan is an offer to gain control of
American Standard." Id. at 782. The court went on to distinguish Ne-amont by pointing
out that whereas Gold Fields stopped just short of 50% ownership in its purchase of
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company's independence and not merely to preserve its own con-
trol.""'7 The court determined that the board's agreement to fi-
nance the purchase of just less than majority ownership of the
company was not equivalent to the sale or break up of the com-
pany, despite the fact that substantial assets were sold in the pro-
cess. Newmont is also noteworthy for its holding that a threat to
the corporation's independence is cognizable under the standard.
Moreover, substantially preclusive responses may be found reason-
able to combat that threat.
2. Macmillan: The Court of Chancery Takes a Lesson
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,"' the Delaware
Supreme Court clarified the board's duties under Revlon and the
simultaneous application of Unocal. The court found the
Macmillan board of directors violated their duties under Revlon
and enjoined an approved merger. The Macmillan board had
been in the process of auctioning the company and was found to
have violated the strict duties of loyalty and care owed to share-
holders during this critical stage by failing to maximize sharehold-
er value.
Following the enjoinder of the board's defensive maneuvers
by the vice-chancellor in Macmillan I,' the Macmillan board be-
Newmont stock, "this is a sale of control in American Standard." Id. at 783. Therefore,
the onerous Revlon duties applied.
Since the recapitalization plan was not calculated solely to maximize shareholder
benefit, but rather had the somewhat dubious goal of corporate independence, the
directors were found in breach of their Revlon duties. The recapitalization plan was
enjoined.
This result is contrary to the holding in Time. After Time, not only would the
corporate independence be a valid justification, but the control analysis would be irrele-
vant as well. Now, the court would presumably find that as the breakup of the company
was not inevitable, Revlon would not apply.
Cf. Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., [1987 Transfer Bender] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 1 93,502 (Del. Ch. 1987) (Revlon was applied where, after -a bid to take the
corporation private via a management led LBO, a competing offer materialized).
137 535 A.2d at 1334.
138 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988). Macmillan was an appeal from the Court of Chancery
of a case referred to by the Delaware Supreme Court as Macmillan I. Macmillan I was a
prior decision in the Court of Chancery and was not appealed.
139 Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del.Ch. 1988) (Macmillan
I). Vice-Chancellor Jacobs enjoined a planned restructuring of Macmillan which was to
have the effect of blocking a hostile takeover attempt by the Bass Group. The restructur-
ing plan, whereby management would garner a vast ownership interest in the corpora-
tion, was considered prior to any takeover activity for the company, and was (purported-
ly) designed to thwart such attempts.
The restructuring plan went through several incarnations, nonetheless, two cen-
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gan the search for a white knight as an alternative to the offer
made previously by the Bass Group. The search netted six possi-
ble suitors, including Robert Maxwell,14 who proposed a con-
sensual merger at an all cash price of $80 per share.
This bid was $5 higher than the Bass bid, and as a result the
Bass Group dropped out of the picture. Nonetheless, Macmillan's
management was not eager to team up with Maxwell. 41 Instead,
they accelerated discussions that had been initiated with one of
the other possible suitors, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR).
After the Maxwell bid, Macmillan's management and KKR formu-
tral concepts remained constant. First Evans, Reilly and certain other members
of management would end up owning absolute majority control of the restruc-
tured company. Second, management would acquire that majority control, not
by investing new capital at prevailing market prices, but by being granted sever-
al hundred thousand restricted Macmillan shares and stock options.
Id. at 1229. Edward P. Evans, chairman and CEO of Macmillan, and William'F. Reilly,
president, were the management directors and leading players in the litigation. With
assistance from Reilly and Beverly C. Chell, vice president, general counsel and secretary,
Evans led the corporation through almost all of its defensive maneuvers during this peri-
od with only token input from the rest of the board.
The court found the "apparent domination of the allegedly 'independent' board by
the financially interested members of management" underscored the impropriety of the
action in Macmillan I. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1265 (the appeal of Macmillan H1). This
domination continued through Macmillan II. The "apparent domination" was due, in.
part, to the fact that Evans hand-picked the "special committee" of independent directors
and then waited two or three months to officially convene the committee. "In total,
Lazard professionals worked with management on the proposed restructuring for over
500 hours before their 'client,' the Special Committee, formally came into existence and
restrained them." Macmillan I, 552 A.2d at 1233.
The vice-chancellor preliminarily enjoined the restructuring, under the Unocal test,
finding that the Bass Group offers posed no threat (and in fact, were superior to the
restructuring proposal), except to management's entrenchment and their "expectation of
garnering a 39% ownership interest in [about half of the restructured company] on ex-
tremely favorable terms." Id. at 1241.
The Delaware Supreme Court in Macmillan, contradicting the vice-chancellor's meth-
ods but not the result, stated that "[b]y any standards this company was for sale both in
Macmillan I and II." Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1285. The Supreme Court here, though not
rejecting the Unocal analysis of the vice-chancellor, effectively stated that the Unocal test
in this context was unnecessary. This placed the company in Revlon mode during the
entire period covered by both cases. In which instance, the duty of the directors in
Macmillan I was clearly abrogated by their failure to react properly to the superior offer
from the Bass Group. It is curious that the vice-chancellor noted that the restructuring,
"although not a sale of an absolute interest, does constitute a sale of effective control"
but did not apply Revlon. Macmillan I, 552 A.2d at 1242.
140 Mills Acquisition Co. was "substantially controlled by Robert Maxwell" and was
referred to as the plaintiff in the case. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1264.
141 The court was quite convinced that the management directors were acting in
their personal self-interest throughout the transaction. Evans' ignoring of Maxwell's
overtures seems to be based on his desire to find a sweeter deal for himself. Id. at
1272.
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lated a buyout plan which included senior management receiving
a "substantial ownership interest" in the surviving entity.' Five
weeks later, after getting no response from Macmillan, Maxwell
made a tender offer at the $80 per share price in his initial pro-
posal.
On May 30, 1988 (during the period covered by Macmillan 1)
Macmillan's investment bankers, Wasserstein Perella and Lazard
Freres, valued the company at a maximum break up value of $80
per share, and represented that the then planned management
restructuring (struck down in Macmillan 1) at $64.15 represented a
"fair" price."' On August 25, 1988, these same bankers issued
new opinions calling the $80 Maxwell bid unfair and inade-
quate.144 The board rejected the Maxwell offer.
Maxwell, at that point, essentially declared that he would top
any offer.145 The Macmillan management snubbed Maxwell's
continuing calls for negotiation and instead (and incredibly)
agreed with KKR to push a KKR merger on the board "even
though KKR had not yet disclosed to Evans and his group the amount
of its bid."141 In addition, KKR was permitted to see financial
documents, towhich Maxwell was refused access.
Macmillan set several auction deadlines, but the gavel was
reluctant to fall. Prior to one of these "deadlines" Evans called
KKR and tipped them to Maxwell's competing offer and
Wasserstein, in a separate call informing KKR of the impending
deadline, referred to several specific terms that'Macmillan needed
in the bid. The KKR bid subsequently reflected this inside infor-
mation. On top of that, Maxwell was led to believe he held the
highest offer.
147
142 Id. The deal provided that "senior management would receive up to 20% owner-
ship in the newly formed company." Id. at 1273.
143 Wasserstein Perella gave a valuation range of $63 to $68 per share. Lazard
Freres valued Macmillan at $72.57 per share on a pre-tax basis. Id. at 1270.
144 I. at 1273. This is not the only time Wasserstein Perella has issued seemingly
one-sided opinions. In fact, it has been noted that, "[a]t such moments, Wasserstein is
more salesman for a deal' than he is the wise, cautious counselor. Little wonder his
detractors-and even some of his admirers-have come to call him 'Bid-'em-up Bruce.'"
Fanning, "Bid-'em-up Bruce"?, FORBES, Aug. 7, 1989, at 60 (the article specifically refers to
the conflict of interest cited by the court in Interco as well as the inside information sup-
plied in Macmillan). See also supra note 84.
145 "Undeterred, Maxwell indicated his intent and ability to prevail in an auction for
the company, as 'nobody could afford to top a Maxwell bid due to the operational
economies and synergies available through a merger of Maxwell's company with
Macmillan.'" 559 A.2d at 1273.
146 Id. (emphasis in original).
147 Id. at 1283.
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KKR's ultimate bid of $90.05 was a cash and securities deal
conditional on the granting of lock-up and no shop agree-
ments. 4 ' Maxwell's bid at that time was $89 all cash. The board
accepted the KKR offer. Thereafter, Maxwell made an offer of
$90.25 subject to the invalidation of the KKR agreement and filed
suit to enjoin it. The vice-chancellor refused to grant the injunc-
tion and the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.'49
The Delaware Supreme Court found the Macmillan board
had been operating within the confines of Revlon, as they were
conducting an auction for the sale of the company. 50 There-
fore, the directors had the "sole responsibility" to maximize share-
holder value.'' The court reiterated that these duties are trig-
gered "whether the 'sale' takes the form of an active auction, a
management buyout, or a 'restructuring' such as that which the
Court of Chancery enjoined in Macmillan I. " 152
The court found the lock-up and no-shop agreements did not
serve the purpose of maximizing shareholder value, and hence,
the intrinsic fairness standard should be applied to the transac-
tion. 153 For not only were the actions of the directors unjustifi-
able on the basis of protecting shareholder value, but they were
not reasonable in relation to any threat to shareholder interests.
The court applied the "fairness" test and found that
"[c]learly, this auction was clandestinely and impermissibly skewed
148 See supra notes 55 and 66.
149 Id. at 1288.
150 The court also briefly referred to its previous determinations of when a company
is for sale, specifically citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334
(Del. 1987) and Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987). Macmillan,
559 A.2d at 1285 n.35.
151
At a minimum, Revlon requires that there be the most scrupulous adherence to
ordinary principles of fairness . . . [as] fuinder these special circumstances the
duties of the board are 'significantly altered' ..... The defensive aspects of
Unocal no longer apply. The sole responsibility of the directors in such a sale is
for the shareholders' benefit.
Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1285.
152 Id. The court noted 'that "[a] refusal to entertain offers may comport with a valid
exercise of business judgment. ... Circumstances may dictate that an offer be re-
buffed, given the . . . company's long term strategic plans." Id. at 1285 n.35.
The Court also summarized what factors may be considered in assessing a bid's
particular thteat. These included: feasibility, risk of non-consummation, and the bidder's
identity. Id. at 1282 n.29.
153 "[W]hen directors in a Revlon bidding contest grant a crown jewel lockup, se-
rious questions are raised, particularly where, as here, there is little or no improvement
in the final bid . . . . [Ihe use of [a no-shop clause] is even more limited than a
lockup agreement." Id. at 1286.
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in" favor of KKR." " ' "It violated every principle of fair dealing,
and of the exacting role demanded of those entrusted with the
conduct of an auction for the sale of corporate control." 155
Certainly, Macmillan is an extreme case. The impropriety of
the managing directors' actions was self-evident. Yet, it illustrates
how the Revlon and Unocal tests interrelate. Once the threshold of
an "auction for the sale of control" of the corporation has been
crossed, the court must review the transaction under Revlon-the
shareholder value maximization test-while the Unocal test polices
conduct of directors generally. Failing either of these tests leads
to the application of the entire fairness test, which forgoes all pre-
sumptions in favor of the board.
56
The court clarified these issues as it felt there was some con-
fusion on the point in the Court of Chancery' 57 by saying that
154 I& at 1281.
155 Id. at 1283.
156 See suprm note 10 and accompanying text.
157 "It is not altogether clear that, since our decision in Revlon the Court of Chan-
cery has explicitly applied the enhanced Unocal standards in reviewing such board ac-
tions." Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1287.
In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988), is an example of the
Court of Chancery's confusion in applying both Unocal and Revlon. The facts are as
follows. In March 1988, three bidders were in an active bidding war to acquire control
of J.P. Stevens & Co. (the three bidders were West Point-Pepperell, Inc., Odyssey Part-
ners, and a vehicle of J.P. Stevens' management, Palmetto, Inc.). Palmetto's mixed cash
and debenture offer was quickly out-paced by the all cash offers of West-Point and
Odyssey. West-Point was a competitor of J.P. Stevens in several textile manufacturing
fields whereas Odyssey Partners was not an operating company and did not have the
internal capacity to replace the management of an ongoing business such as J.P. Stevens.
On March 13, West-Point's offer stood at $62.50 per share with a $15 million fee
payable to J.P. Stevens in the event of nonconsummation. Odyssey offered $61 per
share, subject to financing. Stevens' board of directors considered the proposals. They
rejected West-Point's higher offer based on legal and investment advice that possible
antitrust problems could impair the value of the offer, and accepted Odyssey's lower
offer as a better deal because it was more likely to close and to close sooner. Id. at 773-
76.
West-Point formed a partnership that allegedly would eliminate any antitrust con-
cerns, and on March 24, sent a letter to J.P. Stevens' management expressing a willing-
ness to pay $64 per share cash. On March 28, the J.P. Stevens' board entered into a
revised merger agreement with Odyssey at $64 per share. The revised agreement called
for Odyssey to receive a "topping fee" of up to $8 million if their offer was exceeded
and an expense reimbursement clause of up to $19 million. West-Point sued, claiming
that J.P. Stevens' directors had breached their fiduciary duties under Revlon, and sought
a declaratory judgment that the reimbursement and topping fees be declared invalid and
to preliminarily enjoin completion of the Odyssey offer.
The chancellor noted that when a change in control is in the works, Revlon recog-
nizes a board's duty to "achieve the best possible transaction for the shareholders." Id. at
781. However, he found that a board's decision to give one bidder an advantage over
the other, was protected by the business judgment rule. The chancellor noted that
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the board's "responsibilities" under Revlon did not preclude the
function of their "enhanced duties" under Unocal. This refers to
the board's "responsibility" to maximize shareholder value during
a sale of corporate control, but "[b]eyond that, there are no spe-
cial and distinct "Revlon duties."158 The court was saying that
the board's actions must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed, even in the context of an auction. In other words, if a
corporation enters Revlon mode, the duties of the board of direc-
tors do not stop merely with the conduct of an auction.1 59 For,
the Unocal test remains lurking in the trees of "scar[y]
Revlon-land," 6 ' lest any unsuspecting director stray from the
narrow path of their appointed task.
C. Revlon and Unocal Become Cultured in Time
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,'61 the Dela-
ware Supreme Court went beyond the mere clarification of the
Unocal standard (as they purported to do) and substantially nar-
rowed the scope of review under the Unocal standard.
In 1987, Time, Inc. began exploring expansion possibilities,
and Warner Communications became the focus of these plans. At
the Time directors meeting, on July 21, 1988, the board"2
Revlon's board had acted in bad faith and so had not been protected by the business
judgment rule. The chancellor also noted, as a matter of law, that Unocal was inapplica-
ble to the facts of the case because the board's actions were not "corporate measures
designed to defeat a threatened change in control." Id. at 780.
This was a misreading of when the Unocal and Revlon standards apply and the
error was corrected in Macmillan. Had Unocal and Revlon been applied, any unequal
treatment of bidders, to be reasonable under Unocal, must have had the purpose of
increasing share value under Revlon. In JP. Stevens, despite his assertion that the J.P.
Stevens' board decision was protected under the business judgment rule, the chancellor
undertook a detailed analysis to show that the tilting of the playing field in favor of
Odyssey was reasonable in relation to the advantage that J.P. Stevens & Co. sought to
gain. Id. at 782-83. As it turned out, the outcome would have been the same in both
instances.
158 559 A.2d at 1288.
159 "When Revlon duties devolve upon directors, this Court will continue to exact an
enhanced judicial scrutiny at the threshold, as in Unocal, before the normal presumptions
of the business judgment rule will apply." Id. See also Nachbar, Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. - The Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contest-
ed Mergem and its Effect on Lock-ups and Other Bidding Deterrents, 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 473
(1987).
160 See supra note 71.
161 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
162 Time's board was composed of four inside directors and 12 -outside directors.
Time's inside directors were J. R. Munro, Time's chairman and CEO; N. J. Nicholas, Jr.,
president and CEO of the company since 1986; Gerald Levin, vice-chairman of the
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heard reports from senior management concerning a possible
merger with Warner.1 63 Warner insisted that the form of the
merger be a stock swap merger.1 64
The board approved continuing merger negotiations, but
Time's governance agenda had to be satisfied.1 65 The board con-
sidered a Time-controlled management structure necessary for the
continuation of "Time Culture."16  Although this complicated
board; and Jason D. McManus, editor-in-chief of Time magazine. Id. at 1143.
163 Management informed the board that Warner was the best partner for Time;
that its successful movie studio, its presence in the music business and international
distribution capabilities were suited to Time's objectives. They informed the board that
they had reviewed Paramount, Disney, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal and other enter-
•tainment companies and concluded that Warner was the most desirable partner. 571
A.2d at 1144-45.
164 Warner's. CEO, Steven Ross, insisted on the stock for stock merger to preserve
Warner shareholder's equity in the resulting corporation. Id. at 1145.
.165 The Delaware Supreme Court stated that:
The primary concern of Time's outside directors was the preservation of the
"Time Culture." They believed that Time had become recognized in this country
as an institution, built upon a foundation of journalistic integrity. Time's man-
agement made a studious effort to refrain from involvement in Time's editorial
policy. Several of Times's outside directors feared that a merger with an enter-
tainment company would divert Time's focus from news journalism and threaten
the Time Culture.
Id. at 1143 n.4.
In the opinion below, the chancellor noted that "the firm has tended to reinterpret
its mission from one of supplying information to a relatively educated market segment
to one in which entertainment of a mass audience plays an important role." Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
94, 514, at 93,267 (Del. Ch.), aftid, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Time's focus in the pub-
lishing field confirms this trend. In the first six months of 1989, magazine average circu-
lation fell 7.3%, while Time, Inc.'s Sports Illustrated and People magazine circulation
rose 9.7% and 2.1% respectively. In addition, Time, Inc.'s newest entrant into the pub-
lishing field is a magazine entitled Entertainment Weekly. Reilly, Wall St. J., Feb. 12,
1990, § A, at 4, col. 2. This is the legacy of the important literary tradition that was
artfully portrayed as "Time Culture."
The Delaware Supreme Court trumpeted the importance of Time's governance
agenda in protecting "Time Culture": "Time's officers, on the other hand, made it abun-
dandy clear that Time would be the acquiring corporation and would control the result-
ing board." 559 A.2d at 1145. They then paradoxically agreed to a governing structure
with a 24-member board of directors with the board equally divided between 12 former
Time directors and 12 former Warner directors. The company would have co-CEO's,
first Ross and Munro, then Ross and Nicholas, to be followed by Nicholas alone, after
Ross' retirement. Id. Additionally, though Time was the acquiring corporation in terms
of the mechanism employed in the transaction, Warner shareholders would have owned
62% of the resulting corporation.
166 The board decided that Time's important "Culture" and literary heritage could
only be assured by Mr. Nicholas eventually becoming the sole CEO of the Time-Warner
entity. Warner's CEO, Mr. Ross,. balked when Time insisted that he set a retirement
date. Eventually, however, Mr. Ross was persuaded to step aside five years after the
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negotiations, the companies reached an agreement.
The merger was to be a stock for stock deal167 with Warner
shareholders receiving a 12% control premium.16 On March 3,
1989, the boards of both companies authorized the agreement.
To lock-up the deal, they agreed to exchange a specific number
of shares at the option of either party.169 The Time board of di-
rectors fixed June 23, the date of the annual shareholders meet-
ing, as the date the Time-Warner merger would be presented for
shareholder approval.17
On June 7, Paramount announced a conditional offer to pur-
chase all outstanding shares of Time, Inc. common stock at $175
per share, cash.171 At the Jine 16 meeting, Time's board con-
cluded that Paramount's $175 cash offer was inadequate 172 and
merger. Id. at 1146.
167 The merger agreement called for Warner to merge into a wholly owned Time
subsidiary, with Warner as the surviving corporation. The common stock of Warner
would then be converted into the common stock of Time, Inc. and the name of the
surviving entity would be changed to Time-Warner. Delaware law only required that a
majority of Warner's shareholders approve the merger because it was their stock being
converted. However, New York Stock Exchange rules required a shareholder vote by
Time's shareholders in response to the large amount of equity shares that Time was to
issue pursuant to the agreement. I.
168 Time essentially paid the premium in exchange for the eventual ascension of Mr.
Nicholas as sole CEO, which in turn would protect the "Time Culture." Id. See also Para-
mount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,514 at 93,268 (Del. Ch. 1989).
169 If the exchange agreement was triggered, Warner would have acquired 11.1% of
Time, Inc., and Time would have acquired 9.4% of Warner. 571 A.2d at 1146.
170 Id.
171 The conditions of the Paramount offer were: (i) termination of the Time-Warner
transaction; (ii) termination of the share exchange agreement; (iii) Paramount's approval
of transfers to Paramount by Time of its cable operations; (iv) redemption of Time's
poison pill; and (v) judicial determination that the Delaware Anti-Takeover Statute was
inapplicable. Despite this, Time stock jumped $44 per share in one day and was $60 per
share higher in June than its highest price in March and April. Id. at 1147.
Time management sent a letter to the CEO of Paramount, attacking his personal
integrity and motives. They also sought to delay the government approval process Para-
mount would have to engage in to acquire Time's cable television businesses. Id.
172 The board's determination was, in part, based upon June valuations of Time
shares that were upward of $40 per share higher than March valuations by the same
investment bank, Wasserstein Perella (the March range was $189.88 to $212.25 per share,
while the June valuation was greater than $250 per share). Time's counsel responded
that the June analysis was for a change in control market and the March analysis was
for a different purpose (however, the March analysis also yielded a range for Warner of
$64.39 to $72.87 per share, and Warner's June control market value, as evidenced by
the revised transaction, was $70 per share). Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 at 93,272 (Del. Ch. 1989).
See supra text at note 144 (where Wasserstein Perella, advising target corporation's board,
over a brief span of time, dramatically increased their per share valuation of the target
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resolved to recast the Warner deal in a form that would not re-
quire the approval of Time's shareholders.17 The result was that
Time and Warner recast the merger transaction into a friendly
LBO. The economic terms of the deal were altered dramatical-
ly.174 As the transaction was now an LBO, Warner's sharehold-
ers were to receive a large control premium.- The agreed upon
price for Warner shares was $70 per share.1 75 The governance
provisions, however, remained fairly static. The incumbent direc-
tors of each entity would combine to form the new board of
directors, the co-CEO concept remained intact and Mr. Nicholas
would eventually be the sole CEO. Warner also contractually
bound Time to follow through with the merger.
On June 16; Warner's board approved the new form of the
transaction. They also exercised their option to trigger the ex-
change of shares. June 23, Paramount increased their bid to $200
per share, cash. Time's board of directors met on June 26 and
concluded, again, not to pursue a transaction with Paramount1 76
and to proceed with the Warner transaction. 177 Paramount and
several groups of Time shareholders filed motions seeking to
enjoin the transaction. The shareholder plaintiffs argued that the
original merger agreement constituted a change in control under
Revlon and, accordingly the directors had a fiduciary duty to maxi-
mize shareholder value. Paramount claimed that the recast merger
agreement was subject to Unocal, that it was an unreasonable
response to Paramount's non-coercive tender offer, and thus
corporation).
173 571 A.2d at 1148.'
174 The cash acquisition format created a highly leveraged Time-Warner entity with
$7-10 billion worth of debt. Id.
175 This constituted a 56% control premium over Warner's pre-merger price. Par-
amount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,514 at 93,274 (Del. Ch. 1989).
176 The most significant factors the board weighed in reaching their decision was
their belief that the Paramount offer was inadequate (see supra note 171) and that the
Warner transaction was of greater value and did not pose a threat to "Time Culture."
571 A.2d at 1148.
177 The long-term per share valuation ranges of the re-cast Time-Warner LBO, given
to the board at the June 16 meeting were as follows: 1990 - $106 to $188; 1991 - $159
to $247; 1992 - $230 to $332; 1993 - $208 to $402. The maximum value of each range,
discounted to present value at 20% (conservative, given the time value of money and the
highly speculative nature of the maximum range values) all yield a present value less
than Paramount's $200 per share offer.
The chancellor noted that the 1993 range was one "that a Texan might feel at
home on." Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. [Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,272-73 (Del. Ch. 1989). See supra note 144.
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should be enjoined to allow shareholders to choose between the
transactions. 7 '
1. The Chancellor's Decision
In the Court of Chancery, Chancellor Allen approached the
Revlon issue as a question of whether there was a "change in con-
trol" of Time. As no single shareholder would gain or lose a con-
trolling interest in the company, he ruled that Revlon was not
triggered because the transaction did not constitute a change of
control of the corporation. "Control of both [Time and Warner]
remained in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market." 79
With regard to the Unocal issue, the chancellor found the "over-
arching" question was "[u]nder what circumstances must a board
of directors abandon an in-place plan of corporate development
in order to provide its shareholders with the option to elect and
realize an immediate control premium?" 8 ' This led the chancel-
lor into a detailed discussion of valuations and projections, a
course he had taken before in Interco. Under this analysis Time's
per share valuation was determinative of whether the board's
actions were reasonable in response to the threat posed by the
Paramount bid. Given the slippery world of valuations,' the
plaintiffs made an argument based on the efficient market theory,
that current market values for the shares are the appropriate basis
for the court's decision as they accurately reflect the discount to
present value of the prospects of the entity. The chancellor asked,
does it make any sense, given what we understand or think we
understand about markets, to posit the existence of a distinc-
tion between managing for current value maximization and
managing for longer term value creation-a distinction which
implies, unless I am wrong, that current stock market values
fail to reflect "accurately" achievable future value?"8'
The chancellor, after paying some lip service to the possibility of
the accuracy of the efficient market hypothesis, dispensed with
the theory in Holmesian fashion. "But just as the Constitution
does not enshrine Mr. Herbert Spencer's social statics, neither
178 571 A.2d at 1149.
179 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 at 93,280 (Del. Ch. 1989).
180 571 A.2d at 1149 (as described by the Delaware Supreme Court.).
181 See supra notes 144 and 177.
182 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 at 93,276 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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does the common law of director's duties elevate the theory of a
single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text."183
That said, the chancellor proceeded with the application of
Unocal. He found that the Paramount offer was a threat to Time's
corporate culture and that the valuation of Time by its board and
their refusal to entertain the Paramount offer on that basis was a
reasonable response to the threat.
The chancellor's decision was a logical result of the Unocal
case law. On its face, the holding that there would be no change
in control, even though 62% of the resulting company would be
held by Warner shareholders, seemed puzzling. However, the
Interco/AC Acquisitions approach mandated a specific change of
control analysis, and under most formulations this would not
qualify."s The rest of the opinion followed previously charted
waters. Nonetheless, the Delaware Supreme Court, though it af-
firmed the chancellor's decision, came down quite differently on
the interpretation of the Unocal/RevIon standards.
2. The Revlon Assertion
The Delaware Supreme Court began, as did the chancellor,
with the Revlon claim. The court took this opportunity to clarify
when Revlon duties apply. First, the court refused to accept the
183 ILd. at 93,277. The chancellor noted that "an observer blessed with perfect fore-
sight" may have concurred with the market valuation. However, the question is not
whether a director or an observer has perfect insight into the future value of a corpora-
tion. But, rather, whether the market efficiently values stocks in terms of future poten-
tial. If so, there is no reasonable argument for a director to base his opinion on any-
thing other than public market value maximization.
Obviously, the chancellor, even if he had found the argument convincing, could
not endorse what is known as the "semi-strong" efficient market theory. (The relevant
aspects of the theory posit that the market for shares accurately reflects the value of the
company-including future earnings, etc.-discounted to present value.) Assuming the
theory is correct, the logical result of the chancellor's Interco type analysis would be to
force directors into a kind of Revl on mode at all times. Any decision that arguably did
not maximize immediate shareholder value would be difficult to justify as the director
could no longer claim there was an overriding corporate purpose to the transaction for
long term gain. Though a director's actions are judged daily on the floors of the ex-
changes, in that situation the judgment would have a direct impact on the liability of
the director.
However accurate the efficient market theory may be, it is an untenable policy
position for a state court to maintain-at least untenable for those courts who would
seek to encourage corporate activity in their state. The chancellor could do no other
than finl that "[d]irectors may operate on the theory that the stock market valuation is
'wrong' in some sense, without breaching faith with shareholders." Id.
184 See Gilson & Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L REV. 37
(1990).
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chancellor's discussion of the "change in control" of a corporation
as the trigger for Revlon duties. The court here shifted the focus
to whether the target company made the "dissolution or breakup
of the corporate entity inevitable."
18 5
Taking care not to limit Revlon's application to specific
terms,1 86 the court stated that Revlon only applies when a corpo-
ration either places itself or its assets up for sale voluntarily or, in
response to a hostile bidder, offers an alternative "bust-up" trans-
action itself.8 7 The court reiterated that Time had adhered to
its strategic plan and had not made a sale of the company inevita-
ble. The court underscored the limits it was placing on Revlon, by
saying "we decline to extend Revlon's application to corporate
transactions simply because they might be construed as putting a
corporation either 'in play' or 'up for sale.'" 8 8
Defenders of the corporate bastion can breathe a sigh of
relief. Scary Revlon-land has been confined to a remote region of
the takeover landscape. The court made it clear that Revlon will
not be triggered inadvertently. The subjective intent of directors,
a change in control and the adoption of structural safety devices
will not, by their' mere existence, trigger Revlon.l" 9 In fact, the
only situations this court mentions as relevant to Revlon are "bust-
up" transactions and auctions of a company.' Both of these
situations have always been considered the obvious Revlon trig-
185 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
This language was that originally advocated in the Revlon decision. However, both phras-
es have been a part of the subsequent case law and literature for some time. This new
focus enabled the court to avoid the "large fluid pool" analysis employed by the chancel-
lor. It also underscores the court's nirrowing of Revlon as the threshold of when the
"dissolution or breakup" of a company becomes inevitable is significantly higher than the
"change in control analysis". See also infra note 186.
186 The court was careful to leave the back door wide open by stating that "general-
ly speaking and without excluding other possibilities, two circumstances . . . may impli-
cate Revlon duties." 571 A.2d at 1150.
187 See infra text accompanying note 239.
188 571 A.2d at 1151. The holding clarifies Newmont, where an agreement allowing
the purchase of just less than 50% of the stock in the company was deemed not a sale
of control. The court cited Newmont as a clear case where the company's actions were
.only a defensive response and not an abandonment of the corporation's continued exis-
tence . . . ." Id. at 1150. Time added that if control of the company is held in a "large
fluid pool," or in some way that avoids the inevitability of the break-up of the company,
Revlon will not be triggered despite the sale of more than 50% of the company.
189 Referring to the directors' concern that Time "may be up for sale" the court
said that "such evidence is entirely insufficient to invoke Revlon duties." Id. at 1151.
This concern, as well as the defensive devices, "are properly subject to a Unocal analy-
sis." Id-
190 See infra text at note 239.
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gerIs. The literature, rather, had focused on what constitutes sale
of control for Revlon purposes. 91
3. Unocal's Application: The First Prong
Next, the court turned to the Unocal analysis of the transac-
tion, with similarly sweeping reforms. The court began by giving
the distinct impression that the "just say no defense""9 2 is alive
and well. But, more explicitly, the court rejected the bases for
most of the attacks on the "just say no" defense. The court re-
ferred to Court of Chancery cases where it was held that whatev-
er threat existed "related only to the shareholders and only to
price and not the corporation."' These decisions held that all-
cash, all-shares offers were not coercive and therefore not a threat
to the corporate entity. This led to the ultimate conclusion that
the court must inquire whether the valuations of the company
were reasonable and whether the target board's response was rea-
sonable in light of the valuation of shares. Van Gorkom9 4 had
long ago made valuation studies by investment bankers de rigueur
in sale of asset situations to determine the reasonableness of
board action. These cases expanded on this proposition finding
that if the outside bidders came in at a higher price than what
the target company's board reasonably believed was the target's
value, the board's duty to shareholders demanded that the board
at least give shareholders the opportunity to accept such an offer.
This was, as shown above, the chancellor's approach in the court
below.
The Delaware Supreme Court specifically rejected this ap-
proach taken in Interco "and its progeny" 95 where the court was
put in the position of determining what was the better deal for
191 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 184. The article referenced was written after
the chancellor's decision in Time, but before the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion was
published, in March of 1990. The article focused on the proper method of determining
change of control for purposes of triggering Revlon. See also supra note 76.
192 "We have repeatedly stated that the refusal to entertain an offer may comport
with a valid exercise of a board's business judgment." 571 A.2d at 1152. See Prentice &
Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense': May Target Boards "Just
Say No"? Should they be allowed to?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L 377 (1990). But see Gilson, Just
Say No To Whom? 25 WAKE FOREST L REV. 121 (1990).
193 571 A.2d at 1152. The reference was to City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, Inc., 551
A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103 (Del. Ch. 1986); and Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
194 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
195 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
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the shareholder: staying with the current management, or taking
the outside offer." The court cut short this entire discussion of
long term versus short term value maximization to which the
chancellor had given much time. 9 "Thus, the question of 'long-
term' versus 'short-term' values is largely irrelevant because direc-
tors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for the corporation
which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment
horizon."198
Recent cases interpreting Unocal had seemed to indicate that
a board's powers were limited when confronted with an all-cash,
all-shares, tender offer. 9 9 However, the court rejected the idea
that no threat, other than one to shareholder value, existed.00
The court recognized Gilson and Kraakman's analysis of the
threats that may be posed under Unocal,"0' and implied it was
utilizing the "substantive coercion" prong in its decision, noting
that the authors "suggest [the substantive coercion analysis] would
help guarantee that the Unocal standard becomes an effective inter-
mediate standard of review." 0 2
Structural coercion, as defined by Gilson and Kraakman, has
always been recognized by the court, while Time represents a clear
case of substantive coercion. But the court refused to treat it any
196 "[I]t would involve the court in substituting its judgment for what is a 'better'
deal for that of a corporation's board of directors. To the extent that the Court of
Chancery has recently done so in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject such approach
as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis." I&
197 See supra notes 182-83.
198 571 A.2d at 1150.
199 See City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acqui-
sitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986); Mills Acquisi-
tion Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 161 (Del. 1988); and Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v.
Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
200 "Mhe only conceivable threat, plaintiffs argue, was inadequate value. We disap-
prove of such a narrow and rigid construction of Unocal ... " 571 A.2d at 1153
(footnote omitted).
201 Under Gilson and Kraakman's analysis there are three cognizable threats under
Unocal:
(i) oppotunity loss, or the [AC Acquisitions] dilemma that a hostile offer might
deprive target shareholders of the opportunity to select a superior alternative
offered by target management; (ii) structural coercion, or the risk that disparate
treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort shareholders' tender deci-
sions; and, finally, (iii) substantive coetrion, or the risk that shareholders will mis-
takenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's repre-
sentations of intrinsic value.
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 267 (emphasis in original). The court in Time,
quoted the bulk of this passage. 571 A.2d at 1153 n.17.
202 571 A.2d at 1153 n.17 (emphasis added).
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differently. Gilson and Kraakman state that for a court to fairly
recognize the substantive coercion element it must proceed with a
detailed valuation analysis. 0" The court effectively rejected this
when it stated that valuation was not an issue the court would
review.
Indeed in our view, precepts underlying the business judgment
rule militate against a court's engaging in the process of at-
tempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a long-
term versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders. To
engage in such an exercise is a distortion of the Unocal proc-
ess ....
(So much for the court invoking the Gilson and Kraakman "guar-
antee.")
In addition, the Time board could reasonably view the igno-
rance of their shareholders as part of the threat of Paramount's
offer. That shareholders purportedly could not comprehend the
business synergies involved in the Time-Warner combination was
viewed by the court as a legitimate basis for director concern in
evaluating the threat. Added to this was the allegation that the
timing. of the offer was an attempt to disrupt the Time sharehold-
er vote. The Court held that both of these factors could reason-
ably be -viewed as threats to "corporate policy and effective-
ness."
205
4. The Second Prong
Time's response to Paramount's threat was restructuring the
Warner transaction into an LBO with $10 billion of new debt.
The court stated, "management actions that are coercive in nature
or force upon shareholders a management sponsored alternative
to a hostile offer may be struck down as unreasonable and non-
proportionate responses. "206 This statement, viewed in isolation,
could be looked upon with optimism by shareholders. However,
the Delaware Supreme Court has only held an alternative coercive
if the it precludes the tender offer. Merely having a significant
anti-takeover effect does not make a board's defensive response a
203 This valuation would include a demonstration, by management, of how and when
management expects a target's share value to exceed the offer. See Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 23, at 268. The court apparently found this element of "substantive coerdon"
superfluous. 571 A.2d at 1153.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id at 1154.
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preclusive alternative."0
The court drew a distinction between defensive actions which
are merely management-sponsored alternatives and defensive ac-
tions which promote a corporate plan. "Directors are not obliged
to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-
term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain
the corporate strategy. "2 ' Time's purchase of Warner, although
a defensive response, was part of Time's corporate plan. The
response was proportionate, $10 billion of debt notwithstanding, "so
long as the directors could reasonably perceive the debt load not
to be so injurious to the corporation as to jeopardize its well be-
ing. "209 Accordingly, a board's defensive response with signifi-
cant anti-takeover effect (that is,, as a practical matter, preclusive),
that is related to a pre-conceived plan and doesn't appear to put
a company into bankruptcy, is reasonable.
Time not only solidified the notion that a response just short
of precluding a tender offer is reasonable, but also provided a
new weapon in the board's arsenal. The board may point to a
corporate plan as justification for its practically preclusive actions
as it is merely taking the steps necessary to pursue its pre-existing
corporate policies. 10
207 See supra notes 93, 117-20 and accompanying text.
208 571 A.2d at 1154. It appears that for a corporation's defensive response to be
unreasonable, so long as it was consistent with its corporate plan, and not preclusive,
the corporation would have to be in Revlon mode.
209 Id. at 1155.
210 A previous Chancery court case, Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988), is instructive in showing how Time has defined the parame-
ters of the Unocal rule. The court in Pillsbury followed the chancellor's now discredited
reasoning in Interco and ruled a board's actions unreasonable in relation to a takeover
threat.
In May 1988, Pillsbury became aware of Grand Metropolitan's interest in acquiring
them and began formulating alternative transactions. Grand Metropolitan, in October
1988, began a fully financed tender offer for all common stock of Pillsbury Co. that
rose to $63 per share, all cash. The offer was about 60% more than the closing price of
Pillsbury on September 30, 1988. On October 17, the Pillsbury board met and unani-
mously rejected Grand Metropolitan's offer as inadequate. They also declined to redeem
their outstanding poison pill. Id. at 1052.
In addition, the Pillsbury board had developed a plan which, it said, produced
better long term value for its shareholders. The plan included: (i) a spin-off of a fast
food subsidiary (Burger King) into an independent, privately held company; (ii) a sale of
its Steak & Ale restaurants for cash within six months; (iii) a sale of other food
businesses not specified, and (iv) a sale of both Burger King and the remains of
Pillsbury within the next 2 to 5 years. Id. at 1057.
Pillsbury's experts maintained that shareholders would realize a present minimum
value of $68 per share but would have to wait until 1992 or 1993 to realize it. There
were no competing offers for Pillsbury. As in Interco, the litigation surrounded the target
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IV. THE STRUCTURE AND PARAMETERS OF THE UNOCAL
STANDARD THROUGH PARAMOUNT V. TIME
From this substantial line of cases the Unocal standard has
developed a distinct structure of application, though some of the
parameters of the duties within that structure remain fuzzy. The
period of development has been short for a significant common
law standard of review, but its gestation was necessarily accelerat-
ed by the pace of events in the corporate world of the past de-
cade." The Time opinion caps a significant segment of the de-
velopment of Delaware common law with regard to takeover de-
fense tactics.
board's refusal to redeem its poison pill and the proposed spin-off of a valuable sub-
sidiary.
The court applied the Unocal standard of review to the actions of Pillsbury's board.
The tender offer had caused an increase of $1.5 billion in the market value of the
shares of Pillsbury. According to the court, the real threat to shareholder value, in such
a situation, was the possibility of the tender offer being withdrawn. With no competing
offers to support the price, the stock would, in all likelihood, plummet back to its
September value. The Board's action, leaving the poison pill in place, was not reasonable
in relation to the threat posed. Therefore, under the Intero interpretation of Unocal, the
decision to keep the pill in place was not protected by the business judgment rule. Id.
at 1060.
With regard to the spin-off of Burger King, the court found that to allow it to
occur before the litigation had ended would "invite chaos." Id. at 1061. The court
enjoined the board's decision to restructure the company by spinning-off Burger King.
Pillsbury's board was thwarted and the sale to Grand Met was completed shortly thereaf-
ter.
However, the court, relying on Interco, was on (what turned out to be) shaky
ground. A correct application of Unocal (as defined in Macmillan and Time) might have
gone as follows. First, Pillsbury had abandoned their long-term strategy and, in the face
of the tender offer, were seeking to break-up and sell the company. Pillsbury was in
Revlon mode. Pillsbury's board had a duty to maximize short-term shareholder value.
Second, Pillsbury's poison pill and spin-off of Burger King must have been, under
Unocal, reasonable in relation to the advantage sought, clearing the way for the applica-
tion of their Revlon duties. The poison pill would be reasonable if it could fairly be said
to be a bargaining tool to obtain a higher price. The spin-off, as an effort to delay
shareholder value recovery until 1993, would not be reasonable under Unocal given the
board's Revlon duty to maximize short-term value, assuming that five years would not be
within the scope of what the court meant by "short-term." Regardless of its legal meth-
od, the result in the Court of Chancery in Pillbuiy was probably the same as if the
proper Unocal/Revion course had been followed.
211 Gilson and Kraakman have noted their concern that the development of this
important standard has occurred without benefit of substantive and reflective commen-
tary. Their piece was an attempt to interject such commentary into the process. Specifi-
cally, they encouraged a more substantive review under the reasonable response prong of
the test which they refer to as the "proportionality test." See Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 23, at 248 and 274.
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A. The Structure of the Unocal Standard
Through the Macmillan and Time opinions, the Delaware
Supreme Court has more sharply delineated the interplay of the
duties of care and loyalty. 12 A short walk through the mechan-
ics of review as it now stands, before getting into the specifics of
the standard, may prove helpful.
Unocal provides the standard for judicial review of board
actions taken in response to a hostile takeover attempt, or even a
perceived takeover threat.21 Applying the first prong of Unocal,
the inquiry is whether there exists a threat to corporate policy
and effectiveness.214 Unlike the business judgment rule, the bur-
den of proof throughout Unocal is on the board of directors.2 15
If there is a cognizable threat the inquiry moves to the second
prong of the Unocal analysis. If there exists no threat to the cor-
poration, the only threat being that to immediate shareholder
value (as in the case of a sale of assets or a bust-up sale), then
the inquiry shifts to a Revlon analysis.216
The Revlon analysis is a sub-set of the Unocal standard, which
effectively shifts the focus of the inquiry without leaving the pur-
view of the original test. Under Revlon, defensive actions are im-
permissible unless they serve to maximize immediate shareholder
value. 217 Most basically, this means the board must auction the
company to the highest bidder. The conduct of the auction howe-
ver, is still within the scope of the Unocal test, as there remains
the possibility of director self-interest throughout. Under these
circumstances, the Delaware Supreme Court has mandated that
the directors either secure a level playing field for all bidders or,
if the playing field is tilted, that the tilting is subjected to a
212 See supra text accompanying notes 156 and 188.
213 See supra text accompanying note 46.
214 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989).
215 In Comment, Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devices Employed in the NonCoercive
Tender Offer Context: Making Sense of Unocal, 138 U. PA. L REV. 225 (1989), the author
seems to confuse the duties of loyalty and care in terms of when the intrinsic fairness
test applies. The lower courts have done this as well. See supra note 153. However, it is
important for the proper understanding of the mechanics of the interrelationship of
these duties to make certain distinctions. Primarily, the business judgment rule is assod-
ated with the duty of care and the intrinsic fairness test is associated with the duty of
loyalty. The Unocal test stands as the threshold test between them in the case of actions
taken in response to takeover threats, where both duties necessarily come into play. See
infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
216 See infra text accompanying note 239.
217 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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Unocal analysis.21
The second prong of Unocal asks whether the response was
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. If the court finds the
response reasonable, the board is given the protection of the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule standard
(essentially: whether the directors were grossly negligent) 19 has,
for all practical purposes, been satisfied by the previous inquiry,
and further review is unnecessary.
If, on the other hand, the response of the board is found
unreasonable, the directors' actions are reviewed under the intr-
insic fairness standard.22 ° In this case, the court reviews the
transaction for fairness, fully substituting its judgment for that of
the board.22'
B. The Range of Threats
As the cases have shown, the Unocal threat prong has been
reduced to a brief litany. The threat prong is specifically that "the
burden will lie with the board to prove . . . reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed."222 The court always follows this statement with lan-
guage from Cheff, "[d]irectors satisfy the first part of the Unocal
test by demonstrating good faith and reasonable investiga-
tion." 221 The question is what sorts of situations give rise to rea-
sonable grounds for believing such a danger exists.
The type of threat most readily discernible is the "coercive
threat." Coercive threats are those considered to force sharehold-
ers to tendering into an offer. Two-tier freeze-out mergers are the
quintessential example. Clearly, where the shareholder is threat-
ened with the possibility of receiving junk bonds if they wait to
218 See supra text accompanying note 154. The playing field may be tilted if the
purpose is to secure greater value for shareholders. "'[W]hile those lock-ups which draw
bidders into a battle benefit shareholders, similar measures which end an active auction
and foreclose further bidding operate to the shareholders detriment.'" Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988) (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183).
219 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
220 This is derived from the duty of loyalty owed shareholders by directors. See supra
note 16.
221 See supra note 75.
222 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989).
223 Id. "Directors satisfy their burden by showing good faith and reasonable investiga-
tion; the directors will not be penalized for an honest mistake of judgment, if the
judgment appeared reasonable at'the time the decision was made." Cheff v. Mathes, 41
Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548,,555 (1964). -
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tender into the back end of the offer while the front-end receives
cash, the shareholder is substantially coerced to tender early. This
has been labeled by Gilson and Kraakman as "structural coercion,
or the risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering shareholders
might distort shareholders' tender decisions. "224 This type of co-
ercion has long been recognized by the courts as a serious threat
to both corporate and shareholder interests.
Nevertheless, there are other situations where shareholders
may be led to accept inadequate offers, or where the threat of an
inadequate offer tends to preclude a rational choice as to whether
to tender into the offer or not. This occurred in AC Acquisitions
where the chancellor referred to the first prong of the test as "a
particularization of the more general requirement that a corporate
purpose, not one personal to the directors, must be served by the
[defensive action]." 225 The language appears to recognize that
the threat prong of the test is essentially the Cheff "policy con-
flict/primary purpose " 22 test which merely required directors to
identify some conflict with the potential acquirer with regard to a
valid corporate policy.
The Time opinion solidifies the Cheff approach to the threat
prong. The court endorsed the Time board's contention that con-
tinuing a long term business strategy was a valid corporate pur-
pose and a threat to the existence of that strategy was a threat
under Unocal. Under this characterization of the threat prong it
would be difficult at this point for a board to be unable to ar-
ticulate a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. Merely the
threat to a properly prepared, long-term business plan will enable
the board to point to a cognizable threat.2 7 Even shareholder
ignorance with regard to a corporate strategy is a threat, as share-
holders, unaware of the facts at the disposal of the board, may
not have the information necessary to make rational deci-
sions.228 Thus, threats to corporate policy and effectiveness in-
224 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 267. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (Mesa's front end offer was for only 37% of
the shares of Unocal); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1134 (Del.
1987) (Ivanhoe's offer was for just 42% of the shares of Newmont).
225 See AC Acquisitions v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. Ch.
1986).
226 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 249.
227 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
228 In Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989), the
vice-dancellor had found shareholder ignorance a threat because of the confidential
nature of the Kodak litigation. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. The
holding in Time is more expansive in that shareholder ignorance, generally, can be seen
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dude offers that may disrupt an ongoing corporate plan that the
board views as more valuable "without regard to a fixed invest-
ment horizon."2 9 In essence, almost any tender offer can be
found to constitute a legally cognizable threat to corporate policy
and effectiveness. In addition, the board, even after the fall of the
house of Drexel, in most instances will be able to claim that the
potential threat of hostile offers exist in the particular industry,
regardless of the threat of an actual tender offer.80
C. Proportional or Merely Reasonable in Relation?
The Delaware Supreme Court has made it clear that preclu-
sive actions by the target board are not a reasonable re-
sponse.23 1 However, to be considered as such, the board's re-
sponse must be absolutely preclusive. In Time, the merger with
Warner was, for all practical purposes, preclusive. Nonetheless,
the court cited the RJR Nabisco deal as evidence that it was possi-
ble for some acquirer to bid for the resulting Time-Warner end-
t.232
Gilson and Kraakman have argued that for Unocal to be
more than just a speed bump in the race to the bottom, in the
second prong of the test, the court must actually weigh the propor-
tionality of the response to the threat. However, their remonstra-
tions have gone unheeded.233 Instead, the Delaware Supreme
Court demonstrated in Time that as long as there is a threat of
some kind to corporate policy and effectiveness, then any defen-
sive strategy short of precluding the acquisition entirely is reason-
able.23 4 The court specifically. rejected a valuation method analy-
sis of the response. Such an analysis would require a "showing of
as a threat. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del.
1989).
229 571 A.2d at 1150. Recall that the chancellor found that the board placed preser-
vation of "Time Culture" ahead of any strategic benefits that a merger with Warner
could have provided. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. See also Paramount
Communications v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 94,
514 (Del. Ch.), ard, 571 A,2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
230 See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Dcl. 1985).
231 See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
232 571 A.2d at 1154-55. One wonders how persuasive this argument would sound
today after the collapse of the junk bond market.
233 See supa notes 199-204 and accompanying text. Gilson and Kraakman were likely
well aware that it was late in the.day to persuade the Delaware courts to give real
substance to the Unocal standard. Though the court did use the term "proportional" in
Time it will likely give rise to no more than a semantic application.
234 See supra notes 206-210 and accompanying text.
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how-and when-management expects a target's shareholders to do
better."23 5 The court declined to take up this approach by say-
ing that the "investment horizon" of the valuation is up to the
board.3 6 It is unnecessary for the directors to show "how and
when" they expect greater value to materialize for the sharehold-
er.
23 7
The Delaware Supreme Court's rejection of the Interco/AC
Acquisitions analysis makes it clear that Unocal does not provide a
meaningful proportionality review of a board's response to a take-
over threat. In fact, as long as the board remains within the scope
of reasonable action-just short of precluding non-management alt-
ernatives-their business judgment as to the response will be pro-
tected. The specific relationship of the response to the level of
threat appears to be meaningless. For, as in Time, the threat
posed by Paramount's offer was of the lowest level, yet Time's
"reasonable" response was practically preclusive. 2 8
D. The Revlon Trigger
The Delaware Supreme Court in Time found that there are at
least two (and maybe only two) circumstances in Which a board of
directors may find itself subject to Revlon duties.
The first, and dearer one, is when a corporation initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a busi-
ness reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company.
However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in re-
sponse to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term str-
ategy and seeks an alternative transaction also involving the
breakup of the company .... If, however, the board's reac-
tion to a hostile tender offer is found to constitute only a
defensive response and not an abandonment of the
corporation's continued existence, Revlon duties are not trig-
gered, though Unocal duties attach.3 9
This constitutes, in sum, the Revlon trigger. The standard's history
further illustrates this holding. In Revlon, the court first recog-
235 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 268.
236 571 A.2d at 1150.
237 See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
238 Under Gilson and Kraakman's analysis it was substantive coercion. This repre-
sented the lowest level in their three tier analysis of threats. See supra note 201.
239 571 A.2d at 1150-51 (citations and footnotes omitted). Note that the three sit-
uations cited, sale of the company, business reorganization and alternative transactions in
the wake of a hostile offer, each involve the "bust-up" of a company. See supra note 76.
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nized the fact that when sale of the corporation has become inevi-
table there exists only the threat to shareholder value. Time un-
derscored that the Revlon duties are not conferred upon the
board unless there is "substantial evidence" to suggest the "disso-
lution or breakup of the corporate entity was inevitable."24 °
Newmont, on the other hand, illustrated how high this threshold
of "inevitability" is-as an agreement for control of just less than
50% of the company by a single entity and the sale of substantial
assets did not trigger Revlon. In Time, though over 60% of the
company was transferred to new shareholders, it was not deemed
a dissolution or breakup and therefore did not trigger Revlon.
Additionally, Macmillan clarified that Revlon was yet a subset of
Unocal and that directors continue to be held to that standard
when acting in Revlon-mode.
The court in Time reiterated that in the Revlon situations
cited above, the board no longer faces a threat to corporate poli-
cy and effectiveness.2 41 The corporation is terminating its exis-
tence so no threat to it can exist. Without such a threat defensive
tactics are impermissible, except to increase shareholder val-
ue.242 Actions that can reasonably lead to an increase in the
share price in an auction for the sale of the company wil be
upheld.
Though the court in Time was careful to protect its flank
when delineating at least two Revlon situations, 243 the Revlon
trigger can be reduced to the absence of a threat to corporate
policy in the context of a takeover. If there is no threat, there
can be no reasonable response other than to maximize sharehold-
er value. Consequently, board action that fails to maximize share-
holder value will be reviewed under the intrinsic fairness test. Of
course, practically.speaking, given the court's present formulation
of a Cheff-type threat, outside of the Revlon triggers delineated by
the court in Time, most boards will be able to identify a sufficient
threat to preclude such drastic review, at least initially.244
240 571 A.2d at 1150 (emphasis added).
241 I& at 1150 n.13.
242 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
243 571 A.2d at 1150.
244 "The adoption of structural safety devices alone does not trigger Revlon ....
[S]uch devices are properly subject to a Unocal analysis." I&. at 1151. Though the court
precludes "safety devices" alone from triggering Revlon that does not mean that safety
devices adopted in the complete absence of a threat would not trigger Revlon. But, as
discussed above, it is almost impossible to imagine a situation where there would be a
complete absence of threat to the corporate entity.
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E. Unocal: Threshold Test
Due to the lack of any real inquiry into the specific propor-
tionality of an action in response to a threat to corporate control,
Unocal is no more than a threshold test. A threshold test is an
appropriate response to the tension between the duties of care
and loyalty-the business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness
test. When adjudicating the propriety of directors' actions with re-
gard to a particular threat to corporate policy, it would be prema-
ture for a court to proceed with a detailed analysis of the "pr-
oportionality" of their actions. This is because it would be, albeit
in a limited way, substituting its judgment for that of the
board-a modified fairness test. Instead, what is required (and
what the court has formulated) is an initial test to determine whe-
ther the business judgment rule or the intrinsic fairness test
should be applied. Unlike the business judgment rule, the burden
is on the directors to prove the existence of the threat and the
reasonable response; and unlike the fairness test, the directors'
good faith judgment is given deference. Though some commenta-
tors have argued for more "substantive" review at this stage,24
5
the danger is that the court will be forced to wade into rather
deep and uncharted waters.
For similar reasons, the Delaware Supreme Court in Time
wisely removed itself from the discussion of valuation and scope
of investment issues. Disputes in this area do not lend themselves
to bright lines. Interjecting further into the judicial process the
opinions of those who make valuations for a living cannot serve
any useful purpose.246 Without any meaningful possibility of
245
If the proportionality standard is a threshold test, any hostile offer that is argu-
ably coercive would give management a free hand without further scrutiny by
the courts. By contrast, if the standard is a regulatory test, management would
be forced to justify its choice of defensive actions by reference to the amount
of coercion associated with a particular bid.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 254. Gilson and Kraakman also point to the AC
Acquisitions opinion for support of the "regulatory test." However, the court held that
the management "alternative" was "preclu[sive] as a practical matter." AC Acquisitions v.
Anderson Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113 (Del. Ch. 1986). The Time holding provides
no basis from which to build a more relational test. See also Comment, supra note 215
(The author advocates a formula for use in determining proportionality. Unfortunately,
the Time decision has plainly made such valuation determinations irrelevant.).
246 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. Besides, after Van Gorkom, sometimes
called the "Investment Bankers Relief Act of 1985," do investment banks really need
more involvement in the process?
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clarifying this problem through scrutiny of the relative values of
competing strategies offered by targets and acquirers, a threshold
inquiry is a "reasonable response."
V. CONCLUSION
It may have been merely a coincidence that Pennsylvania was
in the process of approving the nation's most aggressive anti-take-
over legislation just before the publication of the Time opin-
ion.247 But, the race to the bottom is not merely a theoretical
construction of academicians and corporate lawyers. Rather, it is
an important race for Delaware in terms of shaping its internal
policy. The substantial legal economy and the inordinate amount
of attention drawn to the state by the presence of so many corpo-
rations is not something that Delaware will easily relinquish.
The Delaware Supreme Court was obviously aware of these
considerations when writing the Time opinion. And, there will no
doubt be those who will say the direction taken by the court in
Time was in large measure a result -of the fact that it was an im-
portant time to send the message to America's boardrooms that
Delaware still stood firmly behind them.
The Time opinion was, instead, necessitated by the deep doc-
trinal waters the Court of Chancery had waded into in Interco and
AC Acquisitions. As showan above, those decisions mandated the
judicial economic evaluation of competing offers and management
alternatives. This is an area where bias runs rampant, and the
experts rarely agree. 48 Even the sophisticated corporate judicia-
ry of Delaware would find it difficult to draw any reliable lines.
The path the Chancery court was forging (at the urging of Gilson
and Kraakman) was bound to lead the judiciary of Delaware over
their heads into a sea of theories and formulas that produce ques-
tionable results at best. The Delaware Supreme Court deftly ex-
tricated itself from this danger by holding that the entire discus-
sion is irrelevant-management is the sole arbiter of the invest-
ment horizon of the company.249 In this important area of cor-
porate law, a bright line was necessary. A valuation based method
was untenable because it was unpredictable.
Of course, there are always costs for bright lines, and share-
247 See generally Franklin, Tough Takeover Statute; Critics Say Pennsylvania's New Law Is
Extreme, N.Y.UJ., May 3, 1990, at 5, col. 2.
248 See supra note 144.
249 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
holders bear the brunt of this one. Shareholders lose a significant
ability to reap windfall profits during the early period of a hostile
takeover. But, their traditional ability to control the corporation is
unaffected. Though the Time holding may have constrained
shareholders' ability to capitalize on the Paramount offer, it did
not constrain their substantive rights as shareholders. The trade-
off was justifiable.2 50
The Time decision was a reasoned solution to the competing
interests of the business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness
test. A threshold test was a necessary step to allow an initial level
of review of directors' actions in the context of a hostile tender
offer. For a court to go further and review in detail the virtues of
a particular offer, evaluate the management response and then se-
lect the superior alternative, is to invite uncertainty. Reliability in
the judicial process, no less than in corporate management, is a
necessary and important policy objective. The Unocal test, as cur-
rently construed, appropriately serves this end.
Daniel S. Cahill
Stephen P. Wink
250 The rash of anti-takeover legislation in the last couple of years points to a
general acceptance of the notion that limiting takeovers at the expense of some share-
holder control is a necessary policy choice.
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